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Executive Summary 
 
Kenya’s horticultural sector (defined here to include fruit and vegetable production and 
marketing, but not flowers) has received a great deal of attention over the past decade due to 
the rapid and sustained growth of its exports to Europe.  This impressive growth has 
undoubtedly contributed to increased rural incomes and reduced rural poverty in Kenya.  Yet 
despite this growth, exports remain a small fraction of Kenya’s overall horticultural sector.  
For the past decade, over 90% of all fruit and vegetable production was consumed 
domestically, and the domestic market accounted for over 90% of the total growth in quantity 
of fruit and vegetable production.  While over 90% of smallholder farmers in all but the arid 
regions of Kenya produce horticultural products, fewer than 2% do so directly for export. 
 
This overwhelming dominance of the domestic market, combined with slower growth 
experienced in the export sector over the past decade, the challenges that smallholders face to 
continue participating in the export sector, and the possibility of more rapid growth in 
domestic demand, all argue for a more active focus on the potentials and constraints of 
domestic horticulture in Kenya.  Such a focus implies also the need to assess the 
competitiveness of local production and marketing against that of neighboring countries such 
as Tanzania and Uganda.  This paper explores these key issues in three Volumes.  The overall 
objectives of the three Volumes are to provide a broad diagnostic overview of the 
horticultural sector, to identify specific constraints that limit the system’s performance, to 
make suggestions for selected policy and programmatic changes, and to identify key research 
that needs to be done to guide further investments to improve sector performance.  Volume 
II– the present volume – focuses on horticultural marketing, including the share of domestic 
production going to domestic and international markets, market channels within the domestic 
market, the import share of selected FFV crops, and costs within the domestic marketing 
system and resulting competitiveness of Kenya produce with that from neighboring countries.  
Volumes I and III focus, respectively, on horticultural production in Kenya, and on technical 
research and regulatory issues. 
 
The paper is organized as follows.  Chapter 1 provides background and briefly discusses the 
data and methods used in the report.  Chapter 2 estimates the share of domestic FFV 
production going to international and domestic markets.  Chapter 3 identifies the structure of 
horticultural marketing channels, estimates the share of production flowing through 
“traditional” and “modern” marketing channels, and quantifies the imports from Tanzania 
and Uganda of two vegetable and two fruit crops.  Chapter 4 develops marketing cost budgets 
for these same four crops.  Finally, Chapter 5 presents conclusions, recommendations, and 
suggestions for further research.   
 
International and Domestic Market Shares Using data from various sources for 1997-2001, 
we estimate that at least four- to five times more horticultural produce, by value, was sold in 
domestic markets than in international export markets.  If produce consumed on the farm is 
included, the domestic share rises to 7-8 times that of the export market.  Value added in 
domestic markets (post farm gate) was at least three times that in the export sector.   
 
Marketing Channels and Regional Trade Patterns:  The traditional marketing system, 
including urban wholesale markets, continues to play the dominant role in FFV (fresh fruits 
and vegetables) marketing in the country.  Based on retail price relationships between the 
traditional system and supermarkets, and patterns seen in Central and South America, where 
supermarket development began earlier, we estimate that the supermarket share of the FFV   vii 
market in Nairobi is below 10%.  Direct survey evidence for Nairobi reinforces this 
conclusion, suggesting a market share of 4.4% in late 2003.  Outside of Nairobi, it would 
certainly be lower.  The two major chains – Uchumi  and Nakumatt – each carry upwards of 
80 horticultural products in their Nairobi stores, and each has ambitious expansion plans.  
Uchumi and Nakumatt are attempting, with uneven success, to bypass the wholesale markets 
in favor of direct procurement with an assortment of contracted commercial farmers and 
some organized small- and medium-sized farmers.  Based on an assessment of key demand- 
and supply-side factors, we conclude that supermarket FFV shares will grow over time, but 
will remain well below 20% for the foreseeable future; traditional retail outlets served by 
public wholesale markets will continue to dominate the sector. 
 
At the present time, traditional wholesale markets are unattractive to buyers concerned with 
assuring high quality and food safety while reducing procurement cost.  New information is 
needed about options for designing investment programs to facilitate continued smallholder 
participation in fruit and vegetable value chains, while reducing overall marketing costs and 
prices to final consumers.    
 
Banana and tomato imports from the region are estimated to have no more than a 7-8% share 
of the Kenyan market.  Orange imports (nearly all from Tanzania) may exceed 20%, while 
the onion import share (also nearly all from Tanzania) may exceed half.  Kenya exports 
almost no produce to regional markets.   
 
Regional Competitiveness:  Collecting wholesaler budgets are consistent with these observed 
trade patterns: trader profits per unit of bananas and tomatoes are higher for Kenyan produce 
than for imports, profits per bag of oranges are higher for the commodity from Tanzania but 
returns to capital are comparable, and both profit per bag and returns to capital are higher for 
imported onions.   
 
Conclusions, Recommendations, and Further Research:  Fresh fruit and vegetable 
production and marketing value chains are becoming increasingly important to a broad array 
of Kenyan consumers. These also hold potential market opportunities for important segments 
of the smallholder farming community.  But investments are needed to upgrade marketing 
infrastructure and facilitating services for traditional participants in the system.  Important 
forces of change include the entry of supermarkets into the domestic horticultural market.  
Both major supermarket chains indicate that they are moving towards direct procurement 
through “preferred grower” progr ams.  Because the chains’ current market share is very low 
(4% in Nairobi, lower elsewhere) and is likely to grow only to a level of 10-20% over the 
next decade, the risk that they pose is not that smallholders and small traders will be excluded 
from the FFV market. Rather, the risk is that supermarkets may extend the dualism currently 
seen between export and domestic systems into the domestic system itself.  The traditional 
system – and the small farmers and traders who primarily supply it –may be increasingly 
confined to the low income portion of the market, with low value added, high costs, and 
limited profits, while commercial farmers and a small number of organized smallholder 
farmers dominate the smaller but more profitable direct procurement system of the 
supermarket chains.  How to avoid this entrenched dualism, with its negative implications for 
smallholder incomes, rural poverty reduction, and the quality of the urban food supply, is a 
key public policy issue over the next five to ten years.  Initiatives which help reduce this 
dualism will also be likely to increase the domestic system’s competitiveness in regional 
markets.  
   viii 
Expanding domestic and regional markets for Kenyan horticultural produce and integrating 
the country’s smallholder farmers into profitable supply chains that satisfy these markets will 
require investment in three key areas: technical production constraints, “hard” and “soft” 
market infrastructure, and the legal and regulatory environment.  The high level of 
investment needed means that active partnering by government with donors and private 
sector will be crucial.   
 
This volume focuses on horticultural marketing.  In this regard, traditional wholesale markets 
should be the central but not exclusive focus of investments in three key types of hard and 
soft market infrastructure.  First, improved logistical efficiency, especially for loading and 
unloading, is needed to reduce costs and improve hygiene in the markets.  Second, improved 
hygiene combined with logistical improvements will make these markets more attractive 
options for a broader range of retail outlets.  Third, improved grades and standards, and more 
easily available information on prices and volume by grade of product, will increase market 
transparency and further attract customers.   
 
Achieving these improvements will require that wholesale market management take on a 
business orientation while recognizing that it is providing a partial public good by integrating 
smallholder farmers into a more dynamic and competitive system while providing poor 
consumers with higher quality produce at competitive prices.  Active partnering between 
government, private sector and donors will be crucial to mobilize the needed financial 
resources and knowledge to make these improvements.  Government and donors could also 
play an important role partnering with supermarkets to reduce the cost to them of dealing 
directly with smallholder farmers.  Improvement in secondary and tertiary roads is also key to 
modernizing the sector.   
 
To help guide investments to relieve bottlenecks in the production and marketing system, 
further applied research needs to be done in several areas, and used to develop extension 
messages as appropriate: 
  
Urban Retailing, especially market shares for the full range of retail outlet types, the costs 
and standard operating procedures of each retailer’s procurement system, and key bottlenecks 
that, if relieved, could reduce costs and increase quality. 
 
Product quality:  Understanding the degree and specific mechanisms of quality 
differentiation in the traditional system is fundamental to designing a more formal system of 
grades and standards that is workable and that can increase transparency and create a 
dynamic of constant quality improvement.  Improved packaging would make an contribution 
to improved quality over time.   
 
Urban Wholesaling:  The behavior and performance of urban wholesale markets affects 
costs, prices, and the distribution of benefits throughout the production and marketing 
system.  Identifying specific investments to improve logistics, hygiene, and market 
information requires applied research in close collaboration current and potential users.   
 
Links between urban markets and rural producers:  To design programs that link small 
farmers more closely to market outlets, one needs to know more about the system wide “price 
discovery” process.  One would also want to establish how many small farmers sell through 
associations, what cost and other marketing advantages these associations provide, and what   ix 
if any price premia these organized farmers receive.  Finally, it is important to know what the 
share of smallholder farmers vs larger commercial farmers is for the main horticultural crops. 
 
Rural marketing:  We anticipate that many rural households will be net buyers of 
horticultural produce.  If this is true, then the performance of the rural marketing system, 
including rural retailing, will affect the real incomes of net sellers and net buyers.     1 
Improving Kenya's Domestic Horticultural Production and 
Marketing System: Current Competitiveness, Forces of Change, 






1. Introduction  
 
1.1          Background and Objectives 
Kenya’s horticultural sector has received a great deal of attention from local and international 
researchers, government, and donors over the past decade, due to the rapid and sustained growth 
of its export sector (Jaffee 1994, Jaffee 1995, Swernberg 1995, Kimenye 1995, Stevens and 
Kennan 1999, Dolan et al. 1999, Kamau 2000, Thiru 2000, Harris et al. 2001, Minot and Ngigi 
2002).  From a very low base, Kenya’s horticultural exports (defined here to include fruit and 
vegetables but not flowers) grew 9% per year in the first decade after independence, then 17% 
per year from 1974-1983 (Minot and Ngigi 2002). Growth slowed over the 1980s and 1990s, but 
still averaged about 4% per annum over the past decade.  By the year 2000, fruit and vegetable 
exports amounted to US$270m, or 15% of Kenya’s total export economy.  This impressive 
growth has undoubtedly contributed to increased rural incomes and reduced rural poverty, 
through both direct production effects and linkage effects, as horticultural incomes from export 
are re-spent in rural areas.   
 
Yet despite its rapid and sustained growth, exports remain a small fraction of Kenya’s overall 
horticultural sector.  For the past decade, over 90% of all fruit and vegetable production was 
consumed domestically, either on-farm or through domestic markets.  Despite higher percent 
growth rates in the export sector, the absolute amount of growth has come overwhelmingly from 
the domestic sector: between 1992/93 and 2000/01, the domestic market accounted for 98% of 
the total growth in quantity of fruit production and 91% of the total growth in vegetable 
production. Even allowing for higher prices of export commodities, the dominance of the local 
market is clear.   
 
This dominance is reflected at the farm level.  While over 90% of smallholder farmers in all but 
the arid regions of Kenya produce horticultural products, fewer than 2% do so directly for export 
(Bawden et al, 2002.  Kenyan smallholders who have succeeded in producing for the export 
market also face a daunting set of challenges if they are to maintain their participation in the 
sector.  These challenges are driven by increasing consumer demand for quality and food safety 
in the UK and continental Europe, and by the related rise of supermarkets in these areas.  By the 
late 1990s, supermarkets’ share of the fresh fruit and vegetable market in the UK had surpassed 
70%, and the share of chains among supermarkets had increased to nearly 80%.  Consolidation 
in the retail sector has led to increasing market power for large retail concerns, and much more 
control by them over production practices.  A focus on Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs) of   2 
pesticides on fresh produce, and the need to ensure that exports do not exceed these, has led to an 
increasing emphasis on the traceability of horticultural production; exporters want to be able to 
trace production back to the specific farm from which it came in order to ensure quality and safe 
production and handling procedures.   
 
Researchers, development practitioners, and governments are concerned that these changes in 
international supply chains for horticultural and other high-value agricultural products will make 
it increasingly difficult for smallholders to maintain their position in this trade (Dolan et al. 
1999; Dolan & Humphrey, 2001; Dolan & Sutherland, 2002; Harris et al, 2001; Jaffee 2003; 
Kamau and Sisule 2001). Estimates of changes in Kenyan smallholders’ share of the fresh 
horticultural export market vary widely.  Most researchers seem to agree that shares were as high 
as 75% in the early 1990s (Harris 1992).  The most optimistic current estimate is by Kenya’s 
Horticultural Crops Development Authority (HCDA), which places smallholder export market 
shares at 40% for fruit and 70% for vegetables, implying an overall horticultural share of 55-
60%.  Dolan and Sutherland (2002) provide the lowest estimate.  Based on interviews with four 
leading exporters, they suggest that smallholder shares fell to 18% by 1998 and 11% by 2001.  
Minot and Ngigi (2003) suggest that this figure is probably too low, based on the small number 
of firms interviewed and on the tendency of exporters to underestimate smallholder shares “to 
satisfy European buyers who are suspicious of smallholder quality control.”  Minot and Ngigi 
cite Jaffee (2003) as perhaps the most reliable current source. Based on interviews with several 
dozen exporters, he estimates smallholder export market shares of 27% for fresh vegetables and 
85% for fresh fruit, for an overall horticultural share of 47%.  Part of the reason for this much 
smaller estimated decline in smallholder participation in the export market (compared to Dolan 
and Sutherland) is that about 60% of Kenya’s fresh horticultural exports are sold, not to UK 
supermarkets, which have the strictest food safety and quality requirements, but to UK 
wholesalers and other European countries, whose standards are not as strict.   
 
Thus, outright pessimism about continued Kenyan smallholder participation in fresh horticultural 
export markets does not seem warranted. Yet their share does appear to have fallen substantially 
over the past 10 years, from about 75% to under 50%.  In addition, Kenya’s horticultural export 
sector as a whole faces increasingly stiff competition from other African countries such as Cote 
d’ Ivoire, Morocco, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Cameroon. Kenya’s horticultural export 
expansion has been aided by the country’s preferential duty-free access to EU markets under the 
Lome Agreement, which currently runs through 2008.  If this agreement is not renewed, or if 
other developing countries obtain similar benefits, Kenya can expect to face even stiffer 
competition in these markets. Finally, food safety standards in Europe, with emphases on 
traceability and process standards, are set to become much more strict in January 2005 under 
EUROPGAP, implying even higher barriers to smallholder participation.  Thus, the continued 
growth of Kenya’s horticultural exports, and the ability of smallholder farmers to participate in 
any growth that does occur, cannot be taken for granted.   
 
Kenya’s economy is also changing, with continued high rates of urbanization expected to drive 
increases in demand for horticultural products.  If the new government is able to reverse the 
country’s economic decline and stimulate private investment to generate renewed growth in per 
capita incomes, then the increase in domestic demand for horticultural products will accelerate.
1  
                                                 
1  Income elasticities of demand for fruits and vegetables are generally high.   3 
Responding to this growing demand will require increased productivity in both the production 
and marketing parts of the value chain; if productivity and quality remain low in either part of 
the chain, poor consumers will be faced with increasing prices, and small farmers may see little 
effective growth in the demand for their output. 
 
All of these factors – the overwhelming dominance of the domestic market, the slower growth 
experienced in the export sector over the past decade, the challenges that smallholders face to 
continue participating in the sector, the possibility of more rapid growth in domestic demand, 
and the need for productivity growth in both production and marketing to meet this demand and 
protect the real incomes of poor consumers – argue for a more active focus on the potentials and 
constraints that the domestic horticultural market faces in Kenya.  A focus on the domestic 
market implies also the need to assess the competitiveness of local production and marketing 
against that of neighboring countries such as Tanzania and Uganda.  In this paper we explore 
these key issues in three Volumes.  The overall objectives of the three Volumes are to provide a 
broad diagnostic overview of the horticultural sector, to identify specific constraints that limit the 
system’s performance, to make suggestions for selected policy and programmatic changes, and 
to identify key research that needs to be done to guide further investments to improve sector 
performance.  Volume II – the present volume – focuses on horticultural marketing, including 
the share of domestic production going to domestic and international markets, market channels 
within the domestic market, the import share of selected FFV crops, and costs within the 
domestic marketing system and resulting competitiveness of Kenya produce with that from 
neighboring countries.  Volumes I and III focus, respectively, on horticultural production in 
Kenya, and on technical research and regulatory issues. 
 
The specific objectives of this Volume are to:  
 
Estimate the share of domestic FFV production going to international and domestic markets;  
Determine the share of imports from Tanzania and Uganda in Kenya’s horticultural markets; 
Investigate the competitiveness of Kenya’s horticultural produce in local and regional 
markets; 
Determine the current and likely future share of key marketing channels in Kenya’s domestic 
FFV marketing system, especially “modern” channels such as supermarkets and more 
traditional channels such as open air markets and kiosks.   
Recommend steps that should be taken to place Kenya’s domestic horticulture in a position 
to compete favorably in local and regional markets.   4 
1.2. Data and Methods 
To undertake this study, data were obtained from several sources.  Between November 2002 and 
February 2003, secondary data on imports and exports of fresh horticultural produce were 
obtained from Customs Department records in seven cross-border points: Lunga Lunga, Taveta, 
Ilasit, Namanga, Isebania, Busia and Malaba.  Also, 32 horticultural collecting wholesale traders 
sourcing produce from both Kenya and Tanzania/Uganda were interviewed in Mombasa at 
Kongowea market, Nairobi at Wakulima market and in the main market in Taveta.  In addition, 
51 fruit and vegetable retailers were interviewed using a structured questionnaire. Systematic 
method of sampling was used to select them. During these interviews, data were collected on 
various aspects of fresh horticultural trade mainly geared towards determining commodities 
imported and exported, their origin, destinations, quantities, costs, prices, values and comparison 
of different origins of a commodity at a common market point. Discussions were held with 
customs officials at the Kenyan and Tanzania/Ugandan border points on handling of horticultural 
and broader agricultural trade.  
 
Estimates of production entering international export and domestic market channels are based on 
vegetable production data from MoALRD and HCDA data on the volume and value of fresh 
vegetable exports.   
 
Estimates of the market share of various domestic marketing channels are based on results of a 
survey of 524 households residing in Nairobi, carried out in November 2003.  This survey, which 
was designed and executed by Tegemeo Institute, used the CBS sample frame to randomly select 
households throughout Nairobi, including high, medium, and low income areas. The statistical 
design of the sample allows it to be representative of the city as a whole.  The survey gathered 
data on the households’ income, and quantified their purchases of 40 different food items over 
the past 30 days.   
 
Secondary data on various aspects of domestic and export horticulture were gathered from 
Kenya Revenue Authority, Horticultural Crop Development Authority, Ministry of Agriculture 
Livestock and Rural Development-Horticulture Division, Ministry of Trade and Industry, and 
Central Bureau of Statistics.   
 
The paper is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 estimates the share of domestic production entering 
domestic and international export market channels.  Chapter 3 identifies the structure of domestic 
horticultural marketing channels, quantifies the market share of “traditional” and “modern” 
marketing channels, and establishes upper bounds for the quantities of two vegetable and two 
fruit crops imported from Tanzania and Uganda.  Chapter 4 develops domestic and import 
marketing cost budgets for these same four crops.  Finally, Chapter 5 presents conclusions, 
recommendations, and suggestions for further research.   
   5 
2. International Export and Domestic Market Shares 
 
Fruits and vegetables produced in Kenya can be retained on the farm, or marketed through local 
fresh markets, local processed markets, fresh export markets, or processed export markets. 
Establishing what proportion of total production flows through each of these channels is 
hampered by lack of data, especially on processing, and by definitional issues.  In this section we 
first use data from several sources to estimate the proportion of total vegetable production that is 
a) consumed on farm, b) marketed locally, and c) exported in fresh or processed form.  For 
comparability, we value all flows at farm-gate prices.  Next, we value flows in each channel at 
final prices in that channel to estimate total value added in each of these channels.  Together, 
these two results provide a picture of the relative importance of local and export markets for 
Kenya’s horticultural sector. 
 
We focus on vegetables for two reasons.  First, vegetables appear by all accounts to contribute 
most to horticultural export earnings.  FAOStat data on all fresh and processed horticultural 
exports (not including flowers) show vegetables with about a 60% share.  HCDA data, which are 
limited to fresh exports, show vegetables with an 80-85% share over the past five years.  The 
difference in these shares is due to the overwhelming importance of canned pineapples and 
pineapple juice in fruit exports – about 85% of all fruit exports according to FAOStat.  Second, 
pineapple production and exports in Kenya are dominated by Del Monte’s vertically integrated 
production, processing, and export operation: including Del Monte in fruit calculations would 
make them less applicable to the typical smallholder or commercial farm, and we lack data to 
make the calculations accurately without Del Monte.   
 
Vegetable production data come from MoALRD, and include smallholder and commercial 
production.  MoALRD values production at “farm gate” prices that it collects.  HCDA reports 
volume and value data for fresh vegetable exports (primarily French beans and Asian 
vegetables)
2.  These figures represent all exports regardless of whether they come from 
smallholder or commercial farms.  HCDA values are based on FOB export prices; we revalued 
these fresh vegetable exports using MoALRD farm-gate prices to make the production and 
export figures comparable.   
 
This exercise shows that fresh vegetable exports rose from 4-5% of total vegetable production in 
the early 1990s to over 12% in 2000, before falling to about 7% in 2001 (Figure 2.1). The trend 
is clearly positive; the lower figure in 2001 is slightly higher than those for 1996 and 1997 and 
well above those of the early 1990s.  Over the past 5 years (1997-2001), fresh vegetable exports 
averaged 9.3% of production, by value.  Adding processed vegetable exports, which FAOStat 
data show to be about 1/3 as much, by value, as fresh exports, raises the total export share 
(processed plus fresh) of vegetables in Kenya between 1997 and 2001 to about 12%.  In the 
absence of more detailed data, this final calculation assumes that the mix of processed vegetable 
exports is comparable to fresh, and that export prices for fresh and processed are also 
comparable.   
 
                                                 
2   “Asian vegetables” include eggplant, chillis, dudhi, karela, okra , and other vegetables used widely in South Asian 
cooking 
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As a final step to calculate market channel shares, we use data from the 2000 Tegemeo/MSU 
Tampa smallholder income survey which show that 64% of total vegetable production that year 
was sold, and 36% retained on farm.  This calculation provides a lower bound for marketed share 
if we assume, as is reasonable, that commercial producers sell nearly all their production.
3  By 
combining all these data, we arrive at Figure 2.2, showing that the value of vegetable production 
sold and then consumed domestically over the past five years has been at least four-to-five times 
as large as the value exported in fresh and processed form (52% compared to 12%).  If produce 
consumed on the farm is included, the domestic share rises to seven-to-eight times that of the 
export market.   
 
Value added per unit of farm-gate production is higher in the export sector due primarily to 
higher quality and health standards.  Comparing MoALRD farm-gate prices with HCDA export 
prices for French beans and Asian vegetables shows that export prices of these vegetables have 
exceeded farm-gate prices by a factor ranging from 2.7 to 6.2 since 1992, with an average of 3.9, 
or 290%.  In contrast, mark-ups in domestic markets are typically about 100% from farm-gate to 
collecting wholesaler sales, and an additional 20-25% to retail.
4  These figures imply a 150% 
total markup from farm-gate to retail in local markets.  Applying these markup figures to the 
share of production flowing through the domestic and export channels, and continuing to value 
unsold production at farm-gate prices, shows that total value added in domestic vegetable 
markets is nearly three times that in vegetable export markets (Figure 2.3). 
 












































                                                 
3   Unfortunately, MoALRD does not report production separately for smallholder and commercial farmers. This 
makes it impossible to calculate a more accurate marketed surplus figure. 
4   See Tables 6.2, 6.4, 6.6., 6.8, and 6.10 for farm-gate to collecting wholesale markups.  Mark-ups from collecting 
wholesale to retail are based on data collected in Wakulima market in November 2003.  See Appendix XX for the 
original price data.   7 
Figure 2.2. Market channel shares (farm, local sales, export sales) of total vegetable 





FIGURE 2.3. TOTAL VALUE ADDED (AND SHARE) IN FARM, LOCAL SALES, AND EXPORT SALES 


















Source: Derived from Tegemeo/MSU 2000 household survey data, production data from MoALRD, and export data from 
HCDA   8 
 
 
These calculations show two things. First, vegetable exports are an important component of the 
vegetable supply chain, absorbing about 20% of all sold production by value, and accounting for 
about one-quarter of all value added after the farm gate.  Second, domestic markets nonetheless 
remain the primary outlet for vegetable production and generate much more value added than do 
export markets.  This conclusion will hold even more for fruit, which has a higher total value of 
production and lower value of exports. 
 


















Source: Derived from Tegemeo/MSU 2000 household survey data, production data from MoALRD, and export data from 
HCDA   9 
3.  Domestic and Regional Marketing Channels and Product 
Flows of Fresh Horticultural Produce 
 
Various regional cooperation initiatives have been put in place to boost intra-Africa trade, 
including the East African Community (EAC), the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).  Expectations upon formation of these groups were 
that member countries would take advantage of these cooperation efforts to increase their trade 
within regional markets. Yet such trade remains low in both physical and value terms. For 
example, in 1992 the value of total Preferential Trade Area (PTA) country exports was $ 12.453 
billion, and only $ 826 million (about 7%) was to member states. The total value of PTA imports 
was $17.496 billion of which $ 826 million (5%) was from member states (Preferential Trade 
Area, 1994).  
 
Horticulture has been identified as one of the main commodity areas with potential for increasing 
rural household incomes in Kenya. Hence, increasing the volume and value of traded fresh 
horticultural produce among rural agricultural households as well as between them and the rest 
of the domestic, regional and international economy would be in line with the objective of 
increasing rural incomes and reducing poverty.  The purpose of this section therefore is to assess 
the magnitude of trade in fresh horticultural produce between Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda 
through the main border points.  First we examine the marketing channels that domestic and 
imported produce flow through.   
 
3.1  Marketing Channels 
Government assistance to the horticultural sector has been concentrated primarily on the export 
market; public influence on the domestic market is seen primarily through construction of public 
markets, which primarily serve urban areas and are dominated by the horticultural trade, and 
maintenance of roads.  Concerns about traffic congestion and lack of hygiene in public markets 
have become increasingly pressing in recent years, while poor road infrastructure has imposed 
high costs on the marketing of all agricultural products.  Thus, the size of the urban population, 
the degree of self sufficiency of rural households, the purchasing power of urban and rural 
households, and the costs of collecting, transporting, and selling horticultural products are the 
key determinants of the size of the horticultural market for Kenya smallholders.   
  
Figure 3.1 shows the various local, regional and international marketing channels for 
horticultural produce in Kenya, emphasizing the actors involved in the process.  Figure 3.2 
focuses on the principal physical market places through which domestic horticultural products 
pass
5.  The export market is served by a few large–scale own company farms, an increasing 
number of contracted commercial horticultural farms, and a declining but still significant number 
of contracted smallholder farms  (Dijkstra and Magori, 1995).   Independent smallholders 
produce the bulk of the vegetables and fruits for domestic markets.  
                                                 
5   The size of the boxes in both figures should not be taken to indicate the relative size of various channels or actors.  
The figures attempt only to show the types of channels and actors involved, and relations among them.  So, for 
example, neither figure should not be taken to imply that rural consumption is substantially less than urban 
consumption.    10 
FIGURE 3.1. DOMESTIC, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MARKETING CHANNELS FOR 
FRESH HORTICULTURAL PRODUCE IN KENYA   
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The main traders in the regional markets are the wholesalers.  Wholesalers as a group are divided 
into collecting wholesalers and distributing wholesalers. The former specialize in collecting 
produce from farmers in the region. They travel long distances to purchase commodities in spot 
markets from the producing areas and towns in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.  To facilitate 
operation, collecting wholesalers frequently employ purchasing agents who work in the 
production areas on their behalf. Purchasing agents reduce costs by identifying produce for sale, 
carrying out the negotiations, accumulating, assembling and carrying the produce to a nearby 
earth road for ease of collection.  Hence, they streamline the procurement process (Dijkstra, 
1996; 1997; 1999).   Once enough product is obtained, collecting wholesalers then transport the 
commodities to the main cities/towns generally using lorries with a minimum of seven tons. 
These professional collecting wholesalers sell primarily in urban wholesale markets to 
distributing wholesalers
6.  For example, oranges are fetched from Tanga and Morogoro in 
Tanzania and sold in Moshi, Arusha, Mombasa, Nairobi and Kisumu; onions are obtained from 
Arusha/Mang’ola in Tazania and sold in Mombasa, Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. Coconuts are 
obtained from Mombasa and sold in Dar es Salaam, Moshi, Arusha, Nairobi and Kisumu. 
Bananas are obtained from Mbale in Uganda and and Kisii in Kenya and sold in Nairobi.  
 
Collecting wholesalers operate in such a way as to allow distributing wholesalers to focus 
entirely on their urban clientele. This is important in large regional urban centers such as 
Nairobi, Mombasa, Dar es Salaam and Kampala where wholesale and retail markets are 
operational six days a week. For such distributing wholesalers, being absent results in lost 
revenue and poor customer relations (Dikistra, 1997).  The urban clientele that these distributing 
wholesalers serve are highly diverse.  They include traders in traditional open-air retail markets, 
green grocers serving middle-class clientele in roadside kiosks, high-end green grocers mostly in 
established retail centers, supermarkets, and hotels.  Supermarkets have attempted to expand 
their participation in horticultural markets over the past three years, but their market share 
remains quite low (see section 3.2).  The two major chains – Uchumi  and Nakumatt – each carry 
upwards of 80 horticultural products in the produce section of their Nairobi stores, including 
fresh whole produce from Kenya, imported produce, and prepared vegetables ready for cooking.  
Each has ambitious expansion plans, with Uchumi planning to reach 50 stores within five years 
from 30 currently (Weatherspoon et al, 2003).  However, as of March, 2003, these plans 
appeared to be stalled due to financial difficulties that this firm is having. 
  
Urban wholesale market places continue to play a key role in the domestic horticultural 
marketing system as the dominant source of supply for open-air retail markets, kiosks, and small 
stores.  The two largest supermarkets are attempting to by-pass these markets.  Each relies 
primarily on brokers and secondarily on direct procurement with an assortment of contracted 
commercial farmers and some organized small- and medium-sized farmers (Weatherspoon et al).  
It is known that brokers obtain some of their produce in wholesale markets, though detail is 
lacking on the volumes and specific commodities that they tend to procure in this manner.  The 
largest supermarket chains state that they intend to phase out brokers over the next five years as 
they develop their “preferred grower” programs.  Whether in fact they are able to do so will 
                                                 
6  Collecting wholesalers do also sell directly to professional retailers in the market. The distinction 
between the various actors is to some extent artificial because at the end of the day wholesalers often sale 
produce that they have left over directly to consumers, thus taking the role of retailers. The trading system 
is very flexible.   12 
depend on whether these systems are able to provide appreciably better quality produce at 
comparable prices to the traditional system.   
 
 
FIGURE 3.2.  PRINCIPAL FLOWS OF HORTICULTURAL PRODUCTS THROUGH PHYSICAL MARKET 
PLACES IN KENYA  
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3.2. Price Relationships and Retail Market Shares 
Berdegué, et al, in a review of the rise of supermarkets in Central America, show that the 
supermarket share of the fresh fruit and vegetable (FFV) market lags well behind their 
penetration of the overall food market.  While supermarkets’ overall share in food retail is ranges 
from 19% to 50%  in the region, their share of the FFV market ranges only from 5% to 18%  
Similar patterns are found in South America.  The authors suggest that the key reason for the 
lagging FFV share of supermarkets is that they offer similar quality produce for substantially 
higher prices; supermarket prices were found to be 15% to 60% higher than prices for 
comparable products in traditional markets.  The primary advantages of supermarkets were 
convenience, safety, and cleanliness.  Supermarkets’ move in that region towards preferred buyer 
programs and centralized procurement and distribution are attempts to reduce costs while 
maintaining or improving quality, thus enabling them to capture more of the FFV market.   
 
To examine price relationships in Kenya, we present two sets of comparisons, one from a one-
time observation of prices in various market channels in late April, 2003, and another from a 
survey of over 500 consumers in Nairobi, carried out in November 2003.  In late April, 2003, 
researchers collected price data on all FFV items offered for sale in two chain supermarket 
outlets, three randomly selected City Market stalls, one high-end green grocer, and one typical 
roadside kiosk in Nairobi.  The City Market tends toward the higher end of the “traditional 
marketing system”, while roadside kiosks primarily serve Nairobi’s middle - and lower-middle 
classes.  Traditional open air markets serving the city’s poor were not visited.   
 
Table 3.1 first presents information on all items offered by each outlet, then information only on 
the 39 items found in at least one supermarket and at least one City Market Stall (Subset 1), and 
finally on the 13 items found in at least one supermarket, at least one City Market stall, and the 
roadside kiosk.  Four key patterns emerge. First, supermarkets and high-end green grocers have 
much greater variety than the roadside kiosk, with about five times more items on offer.  Second, 
supermarkets and high-end green grocers offer more high-priced imported and semi-processed 
items than either kiosks or the City Market stalls. Kiosks offer few or none: the highest priced 
item in the kiosk was one-half to one-eighth the highest price item in the other outlets.  Third, 
supermarkets (and green grocers) typically, but not always, charge higher prices than other 
outlets on the same items.  In the head-to-head comparison with City Market stalls (subset 1), 
mean supermarket prices were about 13% higher, but Uchumi had the lowest (or tied for the 
lowest) price on 11 of their 32  items, while Nakumatt was lowest on four of their 32.
7  In the 
head-to-head comparison among supermarkets, City Market stalls, and the roadside kiosk, the 
kiosk emerges as the lowest price option; mean kiosk prices on the 13 items were 35% below 
supermarkets and 26% below City Market stalls, and the kiosk had the lowest price for seven of 
the 13 items compared.  Supermarkets were the lowest price option in only 2 cases.   
                                                 
7   While each supermarket individually had only 32 of the 39 items, together they had all 39.   14 
Table 3.1. Product availability and prices of fresh fruits and vegetables in various retail outlets, 
Nairobi, 21-28 April 2003 
  







  Uchumi  Nakumatt       
All  Items           
Total number of items offered  71  79  47  91  18 
Mean price on all items (Ksh/kg)  91  94  66  87  38 
Maximum price over all items (Ksh/kg)  540  399  680  320  80 
Subset 1           
Number of items offered  32  32  39  31  13 
Mean price on these items (Ksh/kg)  69  70  60  72  40 
Minimum price frequency  11/32  4/32  18/39  6/31  7/13 
Subset 2           
Number of items offered  10  12  13  9  13 
Mean price on these items (Ksh/kg)  63  66  54  57  40 
Minimum price frequency  0/10  2/12  5/13  1/9  7/13 
Notes:  1) Two supermarkets: Uchumi Hyper on Ngong Road and Nakumatt Mega on Uhuru Highway, 2) Three 
randomly selected City Market stalls, 3) High-end green grocer is The Corner Shop in YaYa Center, 4) One 
roadside Kiosk on Ngong road, 5)  Subset 1 is the 39 items offered in at least one supermarket and one City Market 
stall, 6) Subset 2 is the 13 items offered in at least one supermarket, one City Market stall, and the kiosk 
 
 
Table 3.2 presents median prices and number of observations for 14 FFV items from the urban 
consumer survey.  We present results for the four most common market channels for FFV 
purchases.  The table shows that the three traditional retail outlets (open air markets, roadside 
kiosks, and hawkers) had similar prices over the 14 items, and that large supermarkets (Uchumi 
and Nakumatt) on average charged about 60% more than these outlets for the same items.
8  
 
These results are nearly identical to the kiosk-supermarket comparison in Table 3.1, and make it 
clear that, compared to traditional retail outlets, supermarket chains are a substantially higher 
cost option for consumers purchasing FFV in Nairobi.  The price differentials between 
supermarkets and traditional outlets in Nairobi appear to be at least as great as those in Central 
America (15-60%; Berdegué, et al).  This, plus the fact that supermarket penetration of the FFV 
market started later in Kenya than it did in Central America, suggests that the supermarket share 
of the FFV market in Nairobi is below the 10% share found in Central America
9.  Outside of 
Nairobi, it would certainly be lower still.   
 
                                                 
8   These data do not allow for quality comparisons among channels. 
9   Njagi (1995) uses results from the CBS Urban Food Purchasing Survey of 1989 to indicate that, in that year, 
supermarket’s share of the total food market in Nairobi was only 2%.  This report has some of the best detail 
currently available on food marketing in  Nairobi.   15 
Table 3.2 Prices for selected FFV items from urban consumer survey in Nairobi, October 
2003 
  Open Air Market    Roadside Kiosk    Large 
Supermarket 
  Hawker 
















Irish Potatoes  8  268    10  115    20  20    10  7 
Sweet Potatoes  17  100    17  22    60  3    20  6 
Tomatoes  24  277    25  179    30  36    24  16 
Cabbage  29  234    21  139    29  25    14  12 
Sukuma Wiki  15  223    13  189    20  20    10  5 
Carrots  20  197    25  113    25  38    20  10 
Onions  20  280    26  167    40  41    30  12 
French Beans  30  43    28  10    50  27    40  4 
Bananas  30  211    30  163    30  26    18  12 
Cooking Bananas  11  130    11  57    6  3    14  5 
Avocado  17  132    17  107    17  9    17  8 
Oranges  33  211    33  134    50  37    33  14 
Pawpaw  17  123    13  64    30  19    13  10 
Mangoes  20  166    20  89    55  19    20  11 
Simple Mean  21      21      33      20   
Minimum Price Frequency  8      6      2      9   
 
 
Results from the urban consumer survey support this contention.  Table 3.3 shows market shares 
for the largest retail outlet channels for four food groups: grains, meals and other staples; dairy; 
meat; and fresh fruits and vegetables.  Despite the apparent growth of supermarkets in Nairobi 
over the past five years, the results show a continued dominance of traditional retail outlets in 
consumer food purchases. Consistent with patterns in other areas of the world, supermarkets’ 
greatest penetration has been in non-perishable staples; chains and independent supermarkets 
have a combined 36% market share in these items.  Supermarket shares do not exceed 16% in 
any other food group, and are only 4% in FFV. 
 
Table 3.4 shows that nearly all FFV purchases in supermarket chains are made by the top 20% of 
households in the income distribution.  The bottom 60% of households reported no FFV 
purchases in supermarket chains, while the next 20% reported making only 1% of their 
purchases there.  Only among the top 20% of households do FFV purchases in supermarkets rise 
to meaningful levels, at 15%.  Even in this highest income group, open air markets and kiosks 
have nearly 80% of the FFV market.   
   16 
Table 3.3. Population Weighted Share of Different Market Outlets in Food Expenditure in 










Duka/shop  Open 
Market 
Kiosk  Butchery  Other 
Minor 
Outlets 
  ---------- % of total expenditure over 40 food items  ---------- 
Staples  21.0%  12.9%  49.5%  6.4%  8.1%  0.0%  2.2% 
Dairy  13.9%  2.1%  55.4%  0.0%  10.8%  0.0%  17.8% 
Meat  3.9%  0.4%  8.9%  11.5%  3.9%  68.4%  3.1% 
Fresh fruit & Veg.  4.4%  0.3%  0.7%  56.4%  35.7%  0.0%  2.6% 
Overall  11.5%  4.8%  28.7%  18.7%  14.3%  16.7%  5.4% 
Notes:  For each food group, the most commonly consumed items were selected for data collection.  Staples include 
maize grain and meal, wheat flour and bread, rice, sugar, spaghetti, macaroni, and other pasta; dairy includes 
pasteurized and raw milk, cheese, yoghurt, and ghee;  meat includes beef, goat, sheep, chicken, and eggs; FFV 
includes irish potatoes, sweet potatoes, tomatoes, cabbage, sukuma wiki, carrots, onions, french beans, bananas, 
cooking bananas, avocado, oranges, pawpaw, and mangoes. 
 
 
Table 3.4: Population Weighted Share of Different Market Outlets in FFV Expenditure in 
Nairobi, by per capita Income Quintile 














Duka/shop  Open 
Market 
Kiosk  Butchery  Other 
Minor 
Outlets 
    ------------------- % of Total FFV Expenditure  -------------------- 
1 (lowest)  7,407  0.0%  0.1%  0.2%  53.3%  42.9%  0.0%  3.6% 
2  19,199  0.0%  0.4%  1.3%  56.7%  38.0%  0.0%  3.6% 
3  33,567  0.0%  0.6%  0.0%  64.3%  33.9%  0.0%  1.1% 
4  59,560  1.0%  0.1%  0.3%  59.3%  38.3%  0.0%  1.0% 
5 (highest)  276,698  14.9%  0.1%  1.3%  48.9%  30.8%  0.0%  4.0% 
Overall  79,079  4.4%  0.3%  0.7%  56.4%  35.7%  0.0%  2.6% 
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3.3. How Rapidly Might the FFV Market Share of Supermarket Chains  
Grow? 
The rate at which supermarket chains will be able to capture FFV market share, and the 
impact that key public and private investments in the traditional marketing system can have 
in maintaining its competitiveness against supermarkets, are key policy issues in Kenya and 
other developing countries.  With an FFV market share of less than 5% in Nairobi (lower in 
the rest of the country) in late 2003, what growth rate can government and donor 
development planners expect over the next decade?  We will briefly examine two key 
demand side determinants of this growth and two supply side determinants.  
 
Per capita incomes and urbanization are both positively associated with the growth in 
supermarket share of the FFV market.  Table 3.5 presents data on both these variables, along 
with FFV supermarket shares, for selected Latin American countries, along with Kenya and 
South Africa.  Three points stand out.  First, Kenya’s per capita income is less than half that 
of the lowest Latin American country, and about one-tenth that of South Africa and the 
wealthier Latin American countries.  Second, Kenya’s urban population as a percent of total 
population is also the lowest in the group.  Finally, even among the wealthier Latin American 
countries, supermarket shares of the FFV market are typically about 20% -- Brazil at 37% is 
unusually high.   
 
Table 3.5.  Purchasing Power Parity Gross National Income per Capita, Urban Population %, 
and Supermarket Share of FFV Market in Kenya, South Africa, and Selected Latin 
American Countries 
Country 






share  Source of FFV share 
Argentina  10,980  89  23 (1997)  Ghezán et al, 2002 
South Africa  10,910  55  15-20?  Weatherspoon, et al 
Costa Rica  9,260  52  18 (2002)  Berdegué, et al, 2002 
Chile  8,840  85  3-8 (2001)  Reardon and Berdegué, 2002 
Mexico  8,240  74  21 (2001)  Schwentesius and Gomez, 2002 
Brazil  7,070  81  37 (1996)  Farina, 2002 
El Salvador  5,160  47  11 (2002)  Berdegué, et al, 2002 
Guatemala  4,380  40  9 (2002)  Berdegué, et al, 2002 
Honduras  2,760  47  12 (2002)  Berdegué, et al, 2002 
Nicaragua  2,150  65  5 (2002)  Berdegué, et al, 2002 
Kenya  970  33  4 (2002)  Current Authors, 2004 
 
 
On the supply side, one key determinant of supermarket share of the FFV market is the 
ability of these firms to bring down costs and improve quality through “preferred supplier” 
programs and centralized procurement.  Doing both is critical in a country like Kenya, where 
the mass of low income consumers are unlikely to pay sustained price premia for higher 
quality produce and where traditional retail markets and kiosks are well adapted to their 
buying habits.  In this regard, it is clear that the poor physical infrastructure and under-  18 
developed system of grades and standards in Kenya simultaneously push supermarkets 
towards preferred suppliers and centralized procurement and raise the cost of instituting these 
systems.  Thus, while Uchumi and Nakumatt seem to view these procurement approaches as 
vehicles to lower cost and improve quality, it remains unclear to what extent they will be able 
to achieve these objectives.  It is also important to note that the empirical record across 
Europe, Latin America, and South Africa of movement towards these parallel procurement 
systems – and away from reliance on traditional wholesale markets – is mixed (Cadilhon, et 
al 2003; Tollens 1997; Fresh Produce Marketing Section 7 Committee 1999; Schwentesius 
and Gomez 2002).  In South Africa, for example, FFV sales through fresh produce markets 
exceed direct marketing volumes by a factor of about six (Fresh Produce Marketing Section 7 
Committee; 1999), while in Mexico most FFV for supermarkets and for export is procured in 
modern wholesale markets with a high level of service provision.  In Europe, wholesale 
markets on the continent have maintained greater importance in FFV distribution than in the 
UK.   
 
The second supply-side determinant of supermarket share of the FFV market is the extent to 
which public investment is channeled into public wholesale and retail markets to enhance 
their competitive position vis a vis supermarkets.  Wholesale markets serving traditional retail 
outlets in the Netherlands and France have increased their market share in recent years due in 
part to public commitment to them, while in Italy public investment in wholesale markets has 
helped them and their traditional retail clients maintain a dominant position in FFV markets.  
Indeed, investment in public wholesale markets can help both the traditional and supermarket 
retail sectors by reducing procurement costs and improving quality for both.  Such investment 
thus contributes to a more diversified, competitive, and higher quality food system – and 
especially fresh produce system – in general.   
 
Based on this brief review, we reach three conclusions. First, the overall food market share of 
supermarket chains is likely to grow over time, meaning that these firms should be an 
important force of change in African food systems.  Second, this growth is likely to be much 
slower in the FFV sector, and market shares of supermarket chains will remain substantially 
lower for FFV than for other food items.  As a result, traditional retail outlets served by 
public wholesale markets will maintain a dominant market share in FFV for the foreseeable 
future; we suggest that this share will remain above 80% over the next decade.  This pattern 
would echo those found in many Latin American countries where, for example, Schwentesius 
and Gomez (2002) indicate that in Mexico, “Despite the growth …, expectations regarding 
(supermarkets’) … ability to displace traditional retailing have not been met.”   In the final 
chapter we turn to the policy implications of these conclusions.  Third, public policy and 
investment towards wholesale and related assembly and retail markets will be a major 
determinant of the structure of the FFV production and marketing system.  If these markets 
are ignored, a dualistic system may emerge in which supermarkets work with commercial 
farmers and a small number of organized smallholders in a parallel procurement system that 
bypasses wholesale markets, while the large mass of farmers, traders, and consumers operate 
in a traditional sector characterized by high unit costs, low quality, and low value-added.  On 
the other hand, forward looking investment in these markets would help establish a more 
integrated but diverse and competitive system in which consumers can access high quality 
produce in a variety of outlets, and small farmers and traders can earn favorable returns in a 
progressive traditional system.   19 
3.4  Formal Border Point Imports and Exports of FFV 
A survey on the main cross border points was carried out in the months of November and 
December 2002 to determine the formal flow of imports and exports of fresh horticultural 
produce between Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. These border posts were Lunga-Lunga, 
Taveta, Loitokitok, Namanga, Isebania, Busia and Malaba. Data on commodity, quantity 
imported/exported and the respective values on daily basis was extracted from Form 88 
booklets and registers of the Customs Department from November 2001 to October 2002.  
Because informal border trade can often be larger than formally recorded trade, border agents 
were also asked to estimate the amount of informally traded produce that crosses the border.  
In between these major entry points, there are smaller posts that were not visited. Also, the 
whole of the Eastern, Northeastern and Northern frontiers were not surveyed because these 
areas are not important entry points for horticulture. However it is important to point out that 
some onions and cabbages have been reported to come from Ethiopia through the Northern 
frontier.  These regions therefore may also be included in future studies.  The results are 
summarized and discussed in the following sub-section.  
 
3.4.1.  Imports of Fresh Horticultural Commodities  
Fresh horticultural commodities passing through the Kenya/Tanzania or Uganda border posts 
vary from one entry point to the next, but oranges, bananas, tomatoes and red onions 
predominate in volume and frequency.  Imports of other fresh horticultural commodities were 
minimal.  
 
Table 3.6 presents information on production, marketed surplus, and imports of these 
commodities.  Because import data is for the November 2001 through October 2002 period, 
we present mean production for each crop during the 2001 and 2002 production seasons.  We 
estimate marketed surplus of each crop using data from the 2000 Tegemeo/MSU rural 
household survey.  To account for informal imports, we create lower bound estimates 
assuming that these imports are nil, and upper bound estimates assuming they are four times 
as large as formal imports.  The latter scenario is two times as large as border agent estimates.  
The table suggests that, during the period of analysis, imports of bananas and tomatoes were 
a relatively minor portion of total domestic supply, while orange imports were more 
substantial, and onion imports may have captured more than half of the Kenyan market.  
 
Table 3.6. Upper- and lower- bound estimates of import market share for selected 
horticultural crops in Kenya 
Import Shares 
Crop 
 Formal imports, 
Nov 01 -- 
Oct 02 (mt) 
Mean Production, 
2001 and 2002 (mt) 
Domestic Marketed 
Surplus, % of 
Production  Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
Bananas  6,885  1,060,000  44  1.5  6.9 
Tomato  3,255  262,500  72  1.7  7.9 
Oranges  4,300  126,000  65  5.0  20.8 
Onions  9,880  58,000  72  19.1  54.2 
Notes: 1) Lower bound estimates assume no informal imports; upper bound assume informal imports are four 
times formal, based on border agent qualitative assessments.  2) marketed surplus percent is from 
Tegemeo/MSU 2000 household survey.  This is for smallholder farms only, and thus provides a lower bound 
estimate on total marketed surplus.   20 
 
Bananas:  Kenya imports bananas mainly through Malaba and Busia border posts (Table 
3.7).  Approximately 70% of the recorded imports were from Uganda, with the balance 
coming from Tanzania through Taita Taveta and Namanga border posts. A key reason for 
importing bananas is that there are sweet varieties  (bogoya) in Uganda which are not 
available in Kenya.  The total recorded number of bunches imported during the period 
analyzed was 404,633 with a total value of Kshs. 42,139,618.  
 
Table 3.7. Import of bananas (bunches) through the Main Cross-Border Posts in Kenya 
Tanzania-Kenya  Uganda-Kenya  Month 





November 01  145  11000  736  4525  20280  36686  3103550 
December 01  63  9200  400  6538  13810  30011  2530550 
January 02  0  5800  208  8068  18500  32576  2967600 
February  22  8800  110  4436  16400  29768  2320100 
March  5604  14200  244  7053  20200  47301  4853443 
April  4353  0  0  7777  11600  23730  3025825 
May  11955  0  138  6153  55400  73646  9153710 
June  8952  0  140  7670  17710  34472  4783000 
July  0  6200  0  7629  6175  20004  1690400 
August  1788  6000  0  10567  11128  29483  2916500 
September  1397  7200  250  4394  15345  28586  2695650 
October 02  1775  0  132  3868  12595  18370  2099290 
Total  36054  68400  2358  78678  219143  404633  42139618 
Source: Kenya Revenue Authority, Customs Department. 
 
Tomatoes:  The production of tomatoes in Kenya and Tanzania is throughout the year. 
Tanzania experiences surplus supply in May to August and November to December. During 
theses months, Kongowea market in Mombasa experiences shortages of local supply.  Hence, 
there is some seasonal importation of tomatoes mainly from Tanzania during these periods 
(Table 3.8).  Seventy-eight percent of the quantities imported go to the coastal region i.e. 
Kongowea market in Mombasa through Lunga-Lunga and Taita Taveta borders. 
Approximately 18% of tomato imports passed through Namanga border post to Wakulima 
market in Nairobi. For the period of November 2001 and October 2002, 92,737 crates of 
tomatoes valued at Kshs. 65,818,607 were imported from Tanzania and some minimal 
quantities from Uganda. In Tanzania, Kenyan collecting wholesalers source for tomatoes 
from Iringa and Lushoto, 915 km and 715 km respectively from Mombasa.  
 
The variety of tomatoes produced in Tanzania is moneymaker. It has a soft skin and a shorter 
shelf life when compared to cal-J, which is produced in Kenya. Kenyan consumers have a 
preference for Cal-J, which has a hard skin and a longer shelf life.    21 
Table 3.8. Import of Tomatoes (crates) through the Main Cross-Border Posts in Kenya 











November 01  2430  1432  530  70  0  85.5  4547.5  2815570 
December 01  1000  859  260  38  0  0  2157  1204150 
January 02  0  0  0  15  0  0  15  13500 
February  0  0  0  5  0  0  5  4000 
March  0  68  0  7  0  0  75  23525 
April  0  28  0  0  0  0  28  7000 
May  12265  1261  739  85  357  24  14731  11869467 
June  0  2008  9460  73  958  0  12499  3870900 
July  17400  2767  5416  8  529  0  26120  18281858 
August  28109  863  358  100  819  0  30249  26141420 
September  1350  95  80  130  196  10  1861  1405567 
October 02  0  205  0  21  223  0  449  181650 
Total  62554  9586  16843  552  3082  110  92737  65818607 
Source: Kenya Revenue Authority, Customs Department. 
 
Oranges:  Orange imports appear to be substantially more important than imports of either 
bananas or tomatoes, with upper bound estimates of imports reaching nearly 10% of local 
production and 15% of local marketed surplus (Table 3.6).  The Kenyan market is a very 
important export market for Tanga region oranges from Tanzania. It has been estimated that 
60% of oranges produced in this region are exported to the Kenyan market during the peak 
production season (Development Alternative Inc., 2003). 
 
For the period considered in the study, oranges were imported throughout the year (Table 
3.9). Of the total recorded cross border imports of oranges, 59% passed through Lunga Lunga 
to Mombasa and 34% through Namanga to Nairobi. A total of 42,565 bags valued at Kshs. 
25,509,575 were imported, about 95% coming from Tanzania. Wholesalers procure oranges 
from Mweza District in Tanzania, which is about 320 km from Mombasa.  
 
Although oranges are produced in most parts of Tanzania, the major areas of concentration 
are Tanga and Morogoro region. It is generally considered that orange production in Tanzania 
grew to a major economic importance during the late 1970s (Development Alternative Inc., 
2003). The Ministry of Agriculture in Tanzania embarked on a plan to improve fruit 
production. Actions focused on the establishment of district nurseries for the production of 
planting materials, the introduction of new cultivars and the establishment of mother 
orchards. Accumulation of surplus fruits that could not be marketed and were pilling up along 
the roadsides was observed as early as 1980s. This led to establishment of processing plants 
in Korogwe, Mweza and Morogoro in the early 1980s. However, they all failed due to lack of 
working capital.  
 
At the time Tanzania was establishing the citrus sub-sector in 1970s, Kenya’s orchards were 
facing an attack from citrus greening disease.  This disease thrives in mid-altitude areas of 
Kenya and has never been fully controlled in the country.  Tanzanian production zones are 
primarily coastal, where the vector which spreads the disease is not active.  Greening has 
therefore not been a major problem in Tanzania, which has allowed it to fill the gap in Kenya 
created by stagnant production over the past 10 years.    22 
Table 3.9.      Import of Oranges (bags) through the Main Cross-Border Posts in Kenya 











November 01  0  148.5  2952    2  167  0  3270  3235000 
December 01  2240  80  1008    0  0  0  3328  1849600 
January 02  1680  0  732    0  16  0  2428  1308800 
February  5383  0  624    14.5  0  0  6022  2459580 
March  1735  31  0    286  0  0  2052  875821 
April  1190  46  837    299  0  0  2372  1554700 
May  980  257  1104    101.5  0  0  2443  1784398 
June  1120  34  1008    79  0  0  2241  1456750 
July  1680  40  1188    2  0  0  2910  1887700 
August  140  110  1272    0  0  0  1522  1429600 
September  1800  200  0    0  796  48  2844  1255426 
October 02  7155  232  3672    0  0  76  11135  6412200 
Total  25103  1178  14397    784  979  124  42565  25509575 
Source: Kenya Revenue Authority, Customs Department. 
 
Onions:  Onion imports appear to be very substantial in Kenya., reaching as high as half of 
local production and   two-thirds of local marketed surplus (Table 3.1).  Kenya imports 
onions from Tanzania throughout the year, nearly all passing through Namanga post to 
Nairobi and Taita Taveta border to Mombasa (Table 3.10). The yield of onions in Kenya is 
one of the lowest of the world producers. Area under production has oscillated around 5,000 
ha over the last ten years and total production (tons) has stagnated around 56,000 tons/yr.  
Thus, as demand for onions has continued to rise with population, Kenya has been forced to 
import from Tanzania.  
 
In addition to horticulture, there were a number of other primary agricultural commodities 
also imported. These were as follows:-  
 
Lunga Lunga:  Groundnuts, Yellow Grams, raw milk, Sorghum, Coconut cake, and   Copra 
cake; 
Taita Taveta:  Beans, Maize, Rice, Dry peas, Tobacco, Timber, Green Grams, arrowroots, 
Sorghum and Groundnuts; 
Namanga:      Maize, Finger Millet, Peas (Dry), Wheat, Cloves, Beans, Fish, Coffee, 
Cotton, Rice,Milk, Groundnuts, Spices, Prawns, Sunflower Cake, Maize 
germ, Sisal, Feed Barley, Cow        peas, Pigeon peas; 
Isebania:     Fish, Ground nuts, Peas, Rice, Maize, Cassava, Sorghum, and Finger millet, 
SimSim and Cotton Seed Cake; 
Busia:       Finger Millet, Maize, Beans, Soya beans, Ghee (milk), Groundnuts, Eggs, 
SimSim, Cow peas, Sorghum, Fish, Ginger (Tangawizi), Cotton Seed Cake, 
Rice Jam, Cassava, Honey, Timber, Wheat bran; 
Malaba:  Maize, Finger millet, Eggs, Beans, Maize bran, G/nuts, Timber, Rice, Green 
Grams, peas, Arrow Roots, Wheat bran, Rice bran, Cotton and omena.   23 
 
Table 3.10:  Red Onions Imports (bags) From Various Border Points 
Tanzania  Uganda  Month 
Taita Taveta  Namanga  Isebania  Malaba 




November 01  2903  11162  12  0  14076.5  12510300 
December 01  2760  9192  2  0  11954  11036300 
January 02  0  6685  1  4  6690  4015550 
February  75  9631  3  0  9709  5930960 
March  884  994  7  0  1884.5  2370665 
April  1019  5280  63  0  6362  5263330 
May  3233  4322  19  0  7574  9076490 
June  1972  7493  16  0  9480.5  8447600 
July  1513  6003  0.5  0  7516.5  6628300 
August  2201  4297  4  0  6502  6983000 
September  2068  125  0  0  2193  4211000 
October 02  1565  9855  4  0  11424  9047640 
Total  20192  75039  131  4  95366  85521135 
Source: Kenya Revenue Authority, Customs Department. 
 
 
3.4.2.  Formal Exports of Fresh Horticultural Commodities  
The export records of the Customs Department indicated that there is very little cross border 
export of fresh horticultural produce from Kenya to Tanzania and Uganda. However, there 
was a substantial amount of recorded fresh coconut exports to Tanzania through the Lunga 
Lunga and Taita Taveta borders.  It was further observed at the Loitokitok border, that 
minimal unrecorded quantities of tomatoes, onions, cabbages, kales (sukuma wiki) and 
indigenous vegetables are sold to Tanzanian residents around Tarakea border point for local 
consumption. These commodities do not reach the main township areas in Tanzania. The 
customs officers said that there is very little export of fresh horticultural produce from Kenya 
to Tanzania and Uganda.   
 
Thus, most of the official trade flow of fresh horticultural produce and raw agricultural 
commodities is from the neighboring countries i.e. Tanzania and Uganda to Kenyan domestic 
markets.  The direction of formal trade flow was assumed to be an indication of the direction 
of flow for informal trade for the same commodities. With this kind of scenario, it was 
concluded that Kenya’s fresh horticultural produce have not yet developed the required 
competitive advantage to claim space in the regional markets.  
 
Improved infrastructure and fewer regulations in Tanzania may be one key reason that it is 
able to export more successfully to Kenya than Kenya is to Tanzania.  Unlike Kenya, 
Tanzania has continued to tarmac roads to its border posts. Four of its border points with 
Kenya are covered by the telecommunication network whereas in Kenya only one  (Isebania) 
is covered. Tanzanian authorities have made issuance of trade permits administratively easy 
and cheap. Any interested trader can access these documents.  In Kenya, procedures for 
issuing permits and import brokerage are complex, and only known brokers can clear goods.  
 
It is not clear what role relative exchange rate movements over the past decade have played in 
promoting imports into Kenya from Tanzania and Uganda.  Since 1994, the Tanzanian   24 
Shilling has depreciated nearly 50% against the Kenyan Shilling, but official inflation data 
(from IMF) indicate that accumulated inflation in Tanzania has also been about 50% higher.  
These patterns would suggest little change in real relative prices between the two countries, 
but may not accurately reflect dynamics affecting the products and areas of  Tanzania under 
consideration.  During this same period, the Ugandan Shilling has fallen about 20%,  while 
accumulated inflation in that country has actually been about 20% less than in Kenya.  These 
patterns do suggest falling real relative prices in Uganda.  This may have contributed to the 
relatively high imports of banana from Uganda.   
 
3.5  Handling of Agricultural Trade at Border Points  
3.5.1 Duty Concessions 
Import duty is the levy charged on any import cargo into the country.  Generally 35% of Cost 
Insurance and Freight (CIF) price is charged on any imports from outside COMESA and 
members of the East African Community (EAC). However, tax concessions are given to 
member states at different percentages. For example, Kenya has given Tanzania and Uganda 
90% concession on primary agricultural produce. Thus, import cargo within this category 
attracts a duty of 3.5%..  Import Declaration Form fees are charged on goods that have a 
value of more than $5,000 at a rate of 2.75% of CIF price.  The interpretation on what rates to 
levy on each commodity is derived from the First Schedule of the Customs and Excise Act 
(Tariff Interpretation). In return for Kenya’s 90% concession, Tanzania and Uganda are 
expected to reciprocate by giving Kenya tax concessions on some categories of cargo e.g. 
primary agricultural produce.  However, Kenya custom officials complain that Tanzania 
frequently resorts to suspended duty (anti-dumping) at 25% on Kenyan goods.  Kenyan 
traders also complain of red tape with high tax rates imposed.  When the Presidents of 
Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya met in July 2003, one action they took was the creation of a 
task force to harmonize duties among the countries to facilitate trade.   
 
3.5.2 Horticultural Crop Development Authority Levy (HCDAL) 
The HCDA levy is a fresh horticultural import levy collected by customs department on 
behalf of HCDA.  However, during the research visit, this charge was not being levied at 
Lunga-Lunga and Taveta.  The charge is supposed to be one shilling (Ksh 1.00) per kg of 
produce. However, indications are that there is substantial under estimation of weights so as 
to minimize the cost. 
 
3.5.3 Measurements and Recording   
It is not easy to get accurate measurements of what comes into the country through cross 
border posts because there are no weighing scales nor standardized packaging of 
commodities. The Custom offices resort to Direct Assessment using Form 88. Because none 
of the border points are properly equipped with computers, electronic weighing machines, 
weigh bridges, and other infrastructure, the officer assessing the cargo uses own judgment to 
estimate the quantity and price per unit and checks with the First Tariffs Schedule whether or 
not it is dutiable (Import Duty) and at what rate. Also, an assessment is made on whether or 
not to charge Import Declaration Form Fees (IDF). One would expect uniformity in all the 
trade parameters assessed for the same commodity in the various border points. This 
however, was not the case; different stations had different measurement units, and charged 
differently for the same produce (Table 3.11). This inconsistency was observed for all 
agricultural commodities traded.  In practice, these procedures appear to result in 
underestimation of measurements, inaccurate recording and ultimately loss of revenue. It also   25 
results in low operational efficiency in trade due to the time and effort wasted by the cargo 
assessment officers in walking within the post. 
 
Table 3.11. Trade Parameters for Oranges in the Various Border Points 











Lunga Lunga  Bag  20 kg  340  3.5  2.75  0 
Taveta  Bag  100 kg  1000  3.5  2.75  0 
Namanga  Ton  1000 kg  6000  3.5  2.75  1 
Isebania  Bag  100 kg  900  7  0  1 
Busia  Bag  18.75 kg  500  3.5  2.75  1 
Malaba  Bag  500 kg  6000  1  0  1 
Source: Kenya Revenue Authority, Customs Department. 
 
3.5.4 Infrastructure  
To enhance accurate measurements and recording of traded cargo in Tanzania, the 
Governments has improved the various forms of infrastructure. Every Tanzanian border point 
with Kenya is supplied with electricity and a plan to computerize them is in progress. In 
Kenya, on the other hand, only two (Taveta and Oloitoktok) of the five border points with 
Tanzania have electricity supply. The road network in some of the border points and their 
production areas is relatively poor. Yet some of these areas are among the main producers 
and suppliers of fresh horticultural produce to major towns and cities. For example, Taita 
Taveta region supplies fruits and vegetables to Kongowea market. Oloitoktok area also 
supplies fresh produce to Nairobi and Mombasa. Yet they are connected to the rest of the 
country with poor roads. Horohoro and Tarakea border points in Tanzania face a similar 
problem. The production areas have seasonal earth roads that are impassable during the rain 
season. Poor road network results in losses due to wastage in the farms and deterioration of 
quality of the produce during transportation to the market. It increases transportation costs for 
inputs and produce resulting in lower margins for farmers.  
 
3.5.5 Border Point Agriculture Personnel 
Whereas several Government departments in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda send officers to 
manage various aspects of trade at the border points e.g. Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate 
Services (KEPHIS), Kenya Bureau of Standards (KBS), Public Health etc, Tanzania in 
addition sends two Agricultural Extension Officers and two Veterinary Officers from the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock to every border point. Their work is to inspect and 
record all types and quantities of agricultural trade leaving or coming into the country.   The 
Ministry of Agriculture in Kenya would need to post Agricultural Officers at the border 
points to monitor and record agricultural trade, summarize the data on quarterly basis and 
send them to the headquarters.  A decision had been made by the Director of Agriculture to 
send officers at the border point. However, it was not implemented. By the time of the survey 
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3.5.6 Telecommunication 
Telecommunication services in East African region are expensive, inadequate and unreliable. 
It has hampered quick and efficient flow of information between farmers and traders at the 
border points/production areas and the markets in the main cities and towns. However, out of 
the five border points of Kenya with Tanzania, only Isebania is not covered with 
telecommunication network; Horohoro, Holili, Tarakea and Namanga are all served by cell 
phone services. Indeed, Kenyan horticultural farmers/purchasing agents in Taita-Taveta area 
who can afford mobile phones have taken lines in Moshi region in Tanzania to enable them to 
receive market information from and transact business with partners or wholesalers at 
Kongowea market in Mombasa. Telecommunication has enhanced regional onion trade 
between distributing wholesalers at Wakulima market and collecting wholesalers at 
Kilombero market in Arusha. Traders in Arusha receive market information from their 
partners at Wakulima market in Nairobi early in the morning. This information forms the 
basis for price negotiation with traders in Nairobi and facilitates quick transaction of business 
before the commodity is shipped to Nairobi. It seems that telecommunication network is 
going to play an important role in business transactions of fruits and vegetables in the 
regional markets in the near future.  
 
3.5.7 Cargo Inspection Facilities (Verification Bays).  
These are the facilities that would assist Customs officials to inspect cargo in the 
transportation vehicles. Such a facility would be a structure with a roof and a pit where cargo 
can be offloaded for thorough inspection.  These facilities are lacking or are not operational 
in all the border posts visited.  This means that the officers cannot be effective in inspecting 
cargo on transit.  
 
3.5.8 Porous Borders 
Except for Malaba, which has a natural but limited barrier (a fast running river), the rest of 
the borders are quite open and difficult to patrol. Border patrols and arrests usually made by 
security agents of the would-be smugglers do not help to solve the problem.  It is estimated 
that in some border points, as much as 90% of all commodities entering Kenya do so 
informally.  Loitokitok border for example maintained they did not make a single official 
entry of any agricultural produce imported through that point because there was none.  
 
The data recorded is estimated at one-third of what actually is traded across the border point.  
It is difficult to ascertain the value of such informal trade.  The most serious limitation is that 
none of the trade data recorded at the border posts is transmitted to KRA headquarters. What 
is remitted is the consolidated revenue by month. The implication is that national agricultural 
figures on trade are inaccurate because what is reported excludes unofficial cross-border trade 
activities. This means that there is underestimation of quantities of commodities imported, 
exported and consumed domestically. Thus, national food policy decisions are based on 
incomplete information.       27 
4. Commodity Competitiveness Between Kenya and 
Tanzania/Uganda 
 
There are two commonly held views that explain how economies grow.  The earlier view was 
that the economic success of a country is based on the available factors of production i.e., its 
comparative advantage.  Comparative advantage is important because it is the basis of 
competitiveness of local production on both internal and external markets (World Bank, 
2000).  A more recent view explains the economic success of a country on the ability of the 
people to add value to available resources i.e., its competitive advantage.  The two views 
result to radically different implications for a country’s economic policy.  The growth of 
economies like Japan with little if any comparative advantage have also lead to the a 
conclusion that indeed, competitive advantage can be created.  
 
“Competitiveness is the degree to which a country can, under free and fair market conditions, 
produce goods and services that meet the test of international markets while simultaneously 
expanding the real incomes of its citizens (Castells, 1996)”. It is the requirement for staying 
in business on a sustained basis (World Bank, 2000).  The fact that Kenya imports substantial 
quantities of some fresh horticultural produce from its regional neighbors while exporting 
very little to them suggests that Kenya is less competitive in these products than are her 
neighbors.  The fact that the country is nevertheless very competitive in international produce 
markets suggests the dualistic nature of Kenya’s horticultural sector.  The export sector, 
comprised of a relatively limited number of organized smallholder farmers along with 
medium- and commercial scale farmers, all of whom receive some level of production and 
marketing support from private export companies, competes effectively in the highly 
competitive and quality conscious markets of Europe. Meanwhile, the domestic sector is 
comprised of the vast majority of (largely unorganized) smallholder farmers, who receive 
little if any production or marketing support.  The sector pays very little attention to 
productivity or quality, and struggles to compete with imported produce primarily from 
Tanzania.   
 
It is for this reason that this section analyzes marketing margins and the subsequent 
distribution of observable marketing costs as a measure of performance and efficiency in the 
production and domestic marketing of horticultural commodities.  The section focuses on 
price spread at wholesale level, estimated wholesale profit and return to investment as 
indicators to measure competitiveness of commodities from Kenya and Tanzania/Uganda at a 
common market and at the farm level. Since the objective was to compare commodities, it 
was imperative to start the analysis at the wholesale level where the commodities from Kenya 
and Tanzania/Uganda meet at Kongowea market in Mombasa and Wakulima market in 
Nairobi. 
 
For ease of comparison, this study focused on collecting wholesalers who purchase the 
commodities from farmers, transport them to the main markets and sell them either to 
retailers or distributing wholesalers. The analysis was based on cost buildup budgets for this 
group of traders of fresh horticultural commodities with a common market destination.  
Though few in number, these traders play a crucial role in the trading system by linking 
farmers and urban traders.  They also have the broadest view of problems and opportunities 
in the system, due to the breadth of their contacts.  Eight collecting wholesalers were 
interviewed for each commodity, 32 in total. Interviews in Mombasa (Kongowea market) and   28 
Taveta were conducted in November 2002, while those in Nairobi (Wakulima market) were 
done in January 2003.  The results are discussed by commodity in the following sub-sections. 
 
4.1. Wholesale Market Analysis Results 
 
4.1.1 Bananas 
Bananas imported into Kenya’s domestic markets are obtained primarily from Uganda in 
Mbale region. Locally, bananas are produced and sold throughout the country (except for arid 
zones), but are most concentrated in Western and Central Highland areas, especially in Kisii 
and Murang’a/Nyeri in central province. Local and imported bananas are sold in Wakulima 
market in Nairobi. Some minimal quantities are imported from Tanzania and sold in 
Wakulima market also whereas others find their way to Kongowea market through Taita 
Taveta border point.  Cost buildup budgets for bananas from Kenya and Uganda at Wakulima 
market are shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The computations were based on a bunch of bananas. 
The statistics indicate that the cost of transportation takes the greatest proportion of 
marketing costs in both Kenya (77%) and Uganda (63%). It is also noticeable that 
transportation cost is higher for bananas from Kenya than for Uganda even though the 
distance covered is longer from Uganda.   
 
Table 4.1 Distribution of Wholesale Marketing Costs (Kshs/bunch) of a Bunch of Bananas                                                                        
               from Uganda and Kenya at Wakulima Market in Nairobi 













% share of 
marketing 
costs 
Handling Costs at source: 
Assembly/Loading 
2.70  5.70  1.00  2.51 
Transport cost from source to market   36.60  77.22  25.00  62.66 
Customs fees   -  -  10.00  25.06 
Council fees per unit   7.50  15.82  3.50  8.77 
Handling Costs at market: *offloading  0.60  1.27  0.40  1.00 
Total marketing costs  47.40  100.00  39.90  100.00 
Source: Authors Computation 
 
Examining the distribution of marketing margins, trader profits, and return on capital shows 
that profits per bunch of banana are more than 50% higher for the Kenyan commodity, but 
returns on capital are comparable for local and imported bananas (Table 4.2).  The main 
advantage that bananas from Uganda have in Kenyan markets is the very low purchase price 
– 20 Ksh/bunch in Uganda vs. 60 Ksh/bunch in Kenya.  Kenyan producers receive 43% of 
the selling price compared to only 25% in Uganda.  Marketing costs from Uganda net of 
customs duties are also lower – about 30 Ksh/bunch vs. 47 Ksh/bunch. Thus, Ugandan 
bananas clearly have a substantial cost advantage over Kenyan bananas.  Yet, despite the 
much more remunerative prices for Kenyan producers, and the somewhat higher local 
marketing costs, imported quantities as a percent of total supply appear to be very low under 
any reasonable scenario (Table 4.1); even if informal imports were 10 times formally 
recorded imports, total imports would only rise to 15% of locally marketed surplus.  It would 
thus appear that Kenyan consumers prefer local varieties of banana.   29 
Table 4.2. Distribution of Marketing Margins, Trader Profit and Return on Capital for a             
       bunch of Wholesale Bananas (Kshs/bunch) From Uganda and Kenya at Wakulima      
                 market in Nairobi 
Category of values   Kenya-Kisii/Nyeri  Uganda-Mbale 
  (Kshs/bunch)  (Kshs/bunch) 
Mean purchase price  60.00  20.00 
Mean selling price  140.00  80.00 
Marketing margin  80.00  60.00 
Marketing costs (including customs duties)  47.40  39.90 
Estimated wholesale profit  32.60  20.10 
Share of selling price accruing to producers (%)  42.86  25.00 
Share of selling price accruing to marketing costs (%)  33.86  49.88 
Share of selling price accruing to wholesalers (%)  23.29  25.13 
Estimated return on wholesale investment (%)  30.35  33.56 




Tomatoes consumed in Mombasa and most of the coastal region are obtained locally from 
Karatina , Loitoktok and Taveta areas. When there is a shortage, tomatoes are imported from 
Tanzania in Iringa. Table 4.3 shows the marketing costs from these production areas to 
Kongowea market in Mombasa. The computations are based on a crate (35 kg) of tomatoes. 
The results indicate that transportation takes the highest proportion  (> 60%) of the marketing 
costs for Kenyan as well as Tanzanian tomatoes. The proportion is greater in all Kenyan 
regions than in Tanzania, though actual transport cost is highest from Tanzania, consistent 
with the longer distances traveled.  
 
The share of selling price accruing to producers in Kenya was about 50% in the regions 
considered (Table 4.4). In Tanzania, the farmers got a relatively small share (28%). The 
difference in actual purchase prices was even greater: Ksh 180/crate in Tanzania, compared 
to Ksh 350-400 in Kenya. With the exception of tomatoes from Taveta, trader profit per crate 
and return to capital were both substantially higher for locally produced tomatoes than for the 
imported product.     30 
Table 4.3  Distribution of Wholesale Marketing Costs (Kshs) of a Crate (35 kg) of Tomatoes       
                 from Tanzania and Kenya at Kongowea Market in Mombassa.  






























915    650    470    309   
Handling cost at 
source: Assembly/ 
Loading/Market fee 
12  4.3  12  9.8  10  7.6  29  18.2 
Transport cost to 
Kongowea market 
172  61.7  90  73.2  100  76.3  100  62.8 
Custom fees  72  25.8             
Any other payment  1.7  0.6             
Council fees per 
unit 
11  3.9  11  8.9  11  8.4  10  6.4 
Handling costs at 
market:Offloading 
/storage/Brokerage  
10  3.6  10  8.1  10  7.6  20  12.6 
Total marketing 
costs 
279  100.0  123  100.0  131  100.0  159  100.0 
  Source: Authors Computation 
 
Table 4.4. Distribution of Marketing Margins, Trader Profit and Return on Capital for Crate  
                 (35 kg) of Tomato at Kongowea Market in Mombassa (Kshs/Crate) 









Mean purchase price  180.00  400.00  400.00  357.14 
Mean selling price  638.00  825.00  825.00  700.00 
Marketing margin  458.00  425.00  425.00  342.86 
Marketing costs  278.70  123.00  131.00  159.20 
Estimated wholesale profit  179.30  302.00  294.00  183.66 
Share of selling price accruing to 
Producers (%) 
28.21  48.48  48.48  51.02 
Share of marketing costs (%)  43.68  14.91  15.88  22.74 
Share of selling price accruing to 
wholesalers (%) 
28.10  36.61  35.64  26.24 
Estimated return on wholesale 
investments (%) 
39.09  57.74  55.37  35.57 




Imported oranges landing at Kongowea market in Mombasa are sourced from Tanga area in 
Tanzania, whereas local oranges come primarily from Shimba Hills, which lies 70 km from 
Kongowea market. The oranges sold in Wakulima market are obtained from Mweza District 
in Tanzania, about 700 km from the market.   No Kenyan oranges were found in Wakulima 
during the period of research.  Orange varieties from Tanzania are of better quality than those 
from Kenya, being consistently larger, juicier and with fewer surface blemishes.  This quality 
superiority is based in part on improved varieties and in part on better control of citrus 
greening disease, which has affected orchards in Kenya since the 1970s.  Although symptoms 
can vary across varieties, the disease is known for producing small irregularly shaped fruit   31 
with a thick, pale peel.  Because the vector which spreads the disease thrives primarily in 
mid-altitude areas, while orange production in Tanzania is concentrated in the coastal 
lowlands, Tanzania has had far fewer problems with this disease.  The “matombo sweet 
variety”, produced only in Mweza district in Tanzania, is especially valued by consumers in 
Nairobi, and in fact has come to be called “Nairobi variety” because so much of its 
production is exported to Nairobi  
 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show the cost budget and selling price shares for wholesale traders in both 
markets. The key result from Table 4.11 is that total marketing costs from Tanga in Tanzania 
are lower than from Shimba Hills in Kenya, despite the transport distance being nearly 5 
times longer from Tanga.  At the time of data collection, transport costs for the 70 km route 
from Shimba Hills were about 90% higher than for the 320 km from Tanga.  This reflects 
extremely poor road infrastructure in the main orange producing areas of the Coast, resulting 
in transport of oranges on head or in wheelbarrow for relatively long distances until reaching 
passable roads.  While the problem is worse during the rains, costs are high throughout the 
year in these areas.   
 
Producer price and the share of selling price accruing to producers are relatively low for 
Kenyan oranges (29%) compared to Tanzanian oranges (44% -- 50%), reflecting both the 
higher quality of Tanzanian oranges and high marketing costs out of Shimba Hills.  Oranges 
from Mweza appear to be of exceptionally high quality, based on their purchase and sales 
prices.  Wholesaler profits per bag are higher for Tanzanian oranges, especially for those 
from Mweza, but returns to working capital are comparable across all purchase locations.   
 
Table 4.5. Distribution of Wholesale Marketing Costs of a Bag (100kg) of Oranges from 
Tanzania and Kenya at Kongowea (Mombassa) and Wakulima (Nairobi) 
Markets  
Tanzania-Tanga  Kenya –Shimba hills  Tanzania –Mweza 
Kongowea  Kongowea  Wakulima 
 
 
Cost Items  Marketing 
costs 
Kshs/bag 












% share of 
marketing 
costs 
Distance from source to 
sale market (Km) 
320    70    700   
Handling cost at source 
Assembling/Loading 
52  22.91  60  21.62  70.70  20.23 
Market fee  6  2.64         
Transport cost per unit 
from source to Kenyan 
market 
100  44.05  186.50  67.21  147.80  42.30 
Custom fees  40  17.62      60.00  17.17 
Any other payment  4  1.76  6  2.16  50.15  14.35 
Council fees per unit  6  2.64  6  2.16  8.00  2.29 
Handling charge at sale 
market: 
           
Offloading  6  2.64  6  2.16  10.00  2.86 
Packing and weighing  11  4.85  11  3.96    0.00 
Security  2  0.88  2  0.72  2.75  0.79 
Total marketing costs  227  100.00  277.50  100.00  349.40  100.00 
  Source: Authors Computation   32 
 Table 4.6. Distribution of Marketing Margins, Trader Profit and Return on Capital for a 








Category of values 






Purchase price  375.00  192.50  1008.75 
Selling Price   850.00  660.00  2005.50 
Marketing Margin  475.00  467.50  996.75 
Marketing Costs  227.00  277.50  349.40 
Estimated wholesalers profit  248.00  190.00  647.35 
Share of selling price accruing to producers  44.12  29.17  50.30 
Share of selling price accruing to marketing costs (%)  26.71  42.05  17.42 
Share of selling price accruing to wholesalers (%)   29.18  28.79  32.28 
Estimated return on traders’ investment (%)  41.20  40.43  47.66 
  Source: Authors Computation 
 
4.1.4 Onions 
Onion imported from Tanzania are mainly produced in Mang’ola in Arusha region, 
approximately 550 km and 450 km  from Kongowea and Wakulima markets respectively. 
Locally, key areas of onion supply to the market are Karatina, Meru, Oloitoktok and Taveta. 
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show the wholesale trade budgets for Tanzanian and Kenyan onions at 
Kongowea market whereas Tables 4.9 and 4.10 are for Wakulima market. The key result 
from Table 4.7 is that total marketing costs – driven by transport costs and “other transit 
costs” – are highest from Taveta in Kenya, which is the shortest distance from Kongowea 
market.  Trader profits per unit and returns to working capital for onions sold in Kongowea 
are both about 2.5 times higher on onions from Tanzania, but are still low compared to other 
commodities analyzed. 
 
Table 4.7 Distribution of Wholesale Marketing Costs (Kshs./bag) of a Bag (100kg) of                      
                Onions From Tanzania and Kenya at Kongowea Market in Mombassa 



















% share of 
marketing 
costs 
Distance from source to 
sale market(KM) 
550    650    373   
Handling cost at Marketing 
fee/Brokerage 
source:Assembly/Loading 
42  7.50  115  19.33  39  5.01 
Transport cost to 
Kongowea market 
217  38.67  235  39.50  390  50.13 
Custom fees  28  5.06         
Any other payment  10  1.78      32  4.11 
Any other cost on transit  10  1.78      72  9.25 
Council fees per unit  48  8.57  48  8.07  48  6.17 
Handling at sales market:             
    Offloading  20  3.57  20  3.36  19  2.40 
    Packing and weighing  35  6.31  27  4.54  30  3.86 
   Cost of nets/ gunny bags  150  26.77  150  25.21  148  19.07 
Total marketing costs  560  100.00  595  100.00  778  100.00 
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Table 4.8.  Distribution of Marketing Margins, Trader Profit and Return on Capital for a 
Bag of Wholesale Onion (Kshs/bag) from Tanzania and Kenya at Kongowea 
Market in                 Mombassa 
 







Mean Purchase price  1483  1560  1447 
Mean Selling price  2400  2300  2367 
Marketing margin  916.67  740.00  920.00 
Marketing costs  559.67  595.00  777.33 
Estimated Wholesale profit  357.00  145.00  142.67 
Prod’r share of selling price (%)  61.81  67.83  61.13 
Share of selling price accruing to 
marketing costs (%) 
23.32  25.87  32.85 
Wholesaler share of selling price (%)  14.88  6.30  6.03 
Estimated return on traders 
investment (%) 
17.47  6.73  6.41 
  Source: Authors Computation 
 
Onions sold at wholesale in Wakulima market show a similar pattern as the Kongowea 
market in terms of cost and distribution of the selling price (Tables 4.9 and 4.10). However, 
the sales unit is a net of 13 kg rather than a bag of 100 kg.  Also, onion wholesalers at 
Wakulima in Nairobi purchase Tanzanian onion from traders in Kilombero market in Arusha, 
rather than purchasing at the farm level as wholesalers in Kongowea do. Thus, purchase 
prices per kg are about 50% higher for onions destined for Wakulima compared to those 
destined for Kongowea in Mombasa
10.  The collecting wholesalers in Arusha market receive 
market information (about quantities and prices) through telephone from their counterparts at 
Wakulima market in Nairobi every morning between 4.00-5.00 a.m. This information forms 
the basis for price negotiation with traders from Nairobi. The onions are then transported to 
Nairobi in ten-ton lorries.   
 
The cost budgets of wholesalers at Wakulima market show that the main cost component for 
both Tanzanian and Kenyan onion is transport and the proportion is higher for Kenyan onion 
than for Tanzanian onion (Table 4.9). The share of selling price accruing to farmers is lower 
for Tanzanian onion than for Kenyan onion (Table 4.10). However, the share of selling price 
accruing to wholesalers is higher for Tanzanian onion (27%) than for Kenyan onion (16%). 
The estimated trader profit and return on investment are also higher for Tanzanian onion than 
for Kenyan onion.   
                                                 
10  The reason for this differential purchasing behavior makes for an interesting story.  Wakulima onion 
collecting wholesalers originally sourced their onion, as they do now, at Arusha point from Tanzanian traders 
who had delivered the product from Kilombero market.  Later on, Wakulima traders realized they could get 
onions more cheaply at the farm gate at Mag’ola point.  As a result, Tanzanian middle men at Arusha could not 
sell their onion as they used to, which lead to an onion “trade war”. It was finally agreed that Wakulima 
collecting wholesalers must stop going to the farms and instead purchase their onion at Arusha. For whatever 
reason, this agreement did not affect traders taking onion to Kongowea market through Moshi.   34 
Table 4.9.  Distribution Of Wholesale Marketing Costs (Kshs./Net) Of A Net (13 Kg) Of   
Onions From Tanzania And Kenya At Wakulima Market In Nairobi 











% share of 
marketing 
costs 
Handling Costs at source         
*Assembling & loading  15.75  12.20  17  20.48 
Transport cost to market per unit  66.65  51.61  44  53.01 
Customs fees or other costs  17.95  13.90     
Council fees per unit   20  15.49  20  24.10 
Handling Costs at market:         
Offloading  8.5  6.58  2  2.41 
Security  0.3  0.23     
Total marketing costs  129.15  100.00  83  100.00 




 Table 4.10. Distribution Of Marketing Margins, Trader Profit And Return On Capital For 
A Net (13kg) Of Wholesale Onion (Kshs/Net) From Tanzania And Kenya At 
Wakulima Market In Nairobi 
Category of values  Tanzania (Kshs/net)  Kenya (Kshs/net) 
Mean purchase price  273.00  168.00 
Mean selling price   550.00  300.00 
Marketing Margin  277.00  132.00 
Marketing Costs  129.15  83.00 
Estimated wholesale profit   147.85  49.00 
Share of selling price accruing to farmers (%)  49.64  56.00 
Share of selling price accruing to marketing costs (%)  23.48  27.67 
Share of selling price accruing to wholesalers(%)  26.88  16.33 
Estimated return on wholesale investment (%)   36.76  19.52 
 Source: Authors Computation 
 
 
Summarizing across all four commodities, results of the collecting wholesaler analysis are 
quite consistent with observed trade patterns (Table 4.11; see also Table 3.6 for estimated 
share of each commodity in the Kenyan market).  Imported bananas and tomatoes take up a 
very small portion of the Kenyan market, and trader profits per unit of each of these 
commodities were shown to be higher for Kenyan produce than for imports.  Return to capital 
on tomatoes was also higher for the local product, while returns on bananas were comparable 
between the imported and local commodity.  Imported oranges take up a larger share of the 
Kenyan market, and the wholesaler analysis shows profits per bag to be higher for the 
commodity from Tanzania, especially the high quality oranges from Mweza.  Returns to 
capital are similar for imported and local oranges.  Finally, onions take up as much as two-
thirds of the Kenyan market, and both profit per bag and returns to capital were shown to be 
higher for the imported commodity. 
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Table 4.11.  Summary marketing cost build-ups for bananas, tomatoes, oranges, and onions 
from Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya to Wakulima and Kongowea markets  



















Bananas           
  From Uganda (Mbale)  20  80  40  20  33.3% 
  From Kenya (Kisii/Nyeri)  60  140  47  33  30.8% 
Tomatoes           
  From Tanzania  180  638  279  179  39.0% 
  From Kenya   386  783  138  260  49.7% 
Oranges           
  From Tanzania           
    Tanga  375  850  227  248  41.2% 
    Mweza  1,009  2,006  349  647  47.6% 
  From Kenya (Shimba Hills)  193  650  278  190  40.3% 
Onions           
  From Tanzania (Mangola)           
    To Kongowea (Mombasa)  1,483  2,400  560  357  17.5% 
    To Wakulima (Nairobi)  273  550  129  148  36.8% 
  From Kenya           
    To Kongowea (Mombasa)  1,504  2,334  686  144  6.6% 




4.2.  Border Point Traders of Fresh Fruits and Vegetables 
 
This section deals with the socio-economic characteristics and business analysis of traders 
dealing with fresh fruits and vegetables at seven border points: Lunga Lunga, Taveta, 
Oloitoktok, and Namanga on the border with Tanzania, and  Isebania, Busia, and Malaba on 
the border with Uganda. Fifty-one respondents were selected using systematic sampling. The 
survey was carried out in November 2002.  
 
Nearly three-quarters of the traders were female, and these tended to be younger (31 years 
average) than the males (36 years).  Three-quarters of all traders were married.  Educational 
levels are relatively high, compared to the general population, with two-thirds having some 
primary education, 18% some secondary, and 6% some post-secondary.  Only 10% had no 
formal schooling.  Most of the respondents (63%) are Kenyan citizens who reside at the 
border town. Twelve precent are foreign traders who also reside at the border town but on the 
Kenyan side, and 23% are Kenyan traders who live within 20 km of the town and commute 
daily to the market.   
 
The majority of the interviewed traders were retailers (53%) but others combine small scale 
wholesale and retail (39%). Only 8% were pure wholesalers.  Transport to or from the border 
market to other market destinations is by lorries (69%), Public Service Vehicles (14%), 
bicycles and pickups (6% each, 12% total) and foot (4%).    36 
 
There are no permanent market structures in the border sites. Most traders (57%) have put up 
simple structures made of wood, iron sheets and polyethylene where they place their 
commodities. Others place them on the open ground (43%). The traders complained of huge 
losses they incur especially during the rainy season. In Taveta, Isebania and Busia, the 
council had not allocated any area for traders, who therefore occupied private plots, from 
which they had instructions to vacate anytime the owners would decide. In Malaba, traders 
sold by the roadside. Forty-five percent of the traders indicated that they were members of 
trading groups. The majority of those who did not belong to any trading group (60%) felt that 
their businesses were too small to join the group (See Table 4.12). Others were willing to join 
but said they were not aware of any self-help group in the area. Few had fears of 
mismanagement of the groups. 
 
Table 4.12. Reasons for not being a Member of Self Help Group 
 Possible Reasons  Frequency  Percent 
No self help group in this market  6  21.4 
Have not attained the requirement for various groups  3  10.7 
Not had need to join one  17  60.7 
Fear of previous experience related to mismanagement  2  7.1 
Total   28  100.0 
 Source: Interviews with Traders, November 2002. 
 
Eighty-three percent of those who are members of groups indicated that the groups provided 
small loans to their members.  Most of the traders are small-scale and hence their contribution 
to the groups is low. There was no collateral required and the loans were given on a rotational 
basis. Seventeen percent of the members indicated that their groups buy household items for 
the members. 
 
The majority of the traders (90%) used their own savings while setting up their businesses. 
The rest borrowed money from relatives and/or friends. Only 22% tried to get credit for 
purposes of horticultural trading. All of them got the credit through the self-help groups. It 
seems that business around the borders remains low partially because of limited credit 
facilities. 
 
Market information around the border markets is mainly by word of mouth (92%) from 
friends, relatives and business colleagues (Table 4.13). The border point traders rely on cross-
border traders for market information. Few rely on the media such as newspapers. The traders 
said they are not aware of any market information program on the radio. 
 
Prices of Kenyan and Tanzania/Uganda commodities appear to be comparable.  However, 
47% of traders interviewed indicated that Kenyan commodities are more expensive (Table 
4.14). Overall, they preferred selling commodities from Tanzania/Uganda since they were 
more profitable unless they were out of stock. The traders complained of high transport 
charges on the Kenyan side. Also, 55% of traders indicated that commodities from 
Tanzania/Uganda are of better quality than Kenyan commodities (see Table 4.15). This has 
led to greater demand for these commodities coupled with their affordability. Traders seem to 
prefer them as they sell faster.   37 
 
 
Table 4.13 Sources of Market Information 
 Information Sources  Frequency  Percent 
From newspapers  2  3.9 
By word of mouth from friends/ relatives/brokers/traders  47  92.2 
Do not need market information for my business  2  3.9 
Total  51  100.0 
 Source: Interviews with Traders, November 2002. 
 
 
Table 4.14. Price comparison among countries 
 Price comparison  Frequency  Percent 
Kenya's commodities are cheaper   19  37.3 
Kenya's commodities are more expe nsive  24  47.1 
There is no difference in price  5  9.8 
Do not Know  3  5.9 
Total  51  100 
 Source: Interviews with Traders, November 2002. 
 
To ensure that they sell quality produce to customers, the traders selected good quality 
produce (86%), and maintained clean sales sites (39%). Others packed the produce for the 
customers (Table 4.16). When asked to list the four main challenges that they felt constrain 
their businesses (Table 4.17), most traders indicated low demand for fruits and vegetables 
(37%), lack of market space (35%), competition from neighboring country traders (22%), and 
harassment by town council authorities (18%). High charges of cess and licenses were 
mentioned by over 10%. Some of the markets (e.g. Taveta) charged sellers when bringing in 
produce and also charged buyers when carrying it out of the market to be taken to other 
market destinations. 
 
Table 4.15. Quality Comparison of Commodities 
 Quality Comparison of Commodities  Frequency  Percent 
Kenya's commodities are better   14  29.4 
Tanzania' s/ Uganda's commodities are better   29  54.9 
They are bout the same quality  5  9.8 
Do not Know  3  5.9 
Total  51  100.0 




Table 4.16. How to Ensure Quality Commodities are Sold 
Action to Ensure Quality  Frequency  Percent 
By packing the produce  11  21.6 
By maintaining clean sales site  20  39.2 
By doing selection of good produce  44  86.3 
Others  2  3.90 
 Source: Interviews with Traders, November 2002. 
 
 
 Table 4.17. Challenges Traders are Facing 
 Challenges Traders are facing  Frequency  Percent 
Competition from neighboring country traders  11  21.6 
Lack of market space  18  35.3 
High charges of cess and licenses  6  11.8 
Harassment by town council authorities  9  17.6 
Low demand  19  37.3 
Hostility from traders across the border  1  2.0 
Tribalism  1  2.0 
Poor exchange rate  1  2.0 
  Source: Interviews with Traders, November 2002. 
 
To tackle these challenges, nearly all traders referred to physical conditions in the markets: 
three-quarters felt that the township councils could assist them by constructing market 
facilities, and nearly one-quarter referred to the need to improve coordination and allocation 
of space within the market (Table 4.18). This could help reduce losses incurred through 
damage and boost security in the market. Lack of credit facility was another serious 
limitation to expanding business operations among traders and micro-finance institutions 
could intervene to uplift their businesses. 
 
Some traders complained of high transport charges due to the poor state of roads and asked if 
the government could intervene to construct new roads and maintain the existing ones. They 
complained of harassment by custom officials when they intend to sell across the borders and 
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 Table 4.18. Opportunities for Interventions 
Possible Areas for Intervention  Frequency  Percent 
Storage facilities at the border  1  2 
Improved roads  2  4 
Transport availability  7  14 
Constructing a market facility  38  76 
Provision of credit facilities  14  28 
Supply of electricity to the border market  2  4 
Effective market co-ordination and allocation of space  12  24 
Lower commission  4  8 
Cooperation by customs officials  1  2 
Allow more cross-border trade  1  2 
Improve prices  1  2 
Note: Traders referred to more than one action, thus percentages sum to more than 100% 
Source: Interviews with Traders, November 2002. 
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5. Conclusions, Recommendations, and Further Research 
 
This report has shown that, despite very high growth rates in export horticulture in Kenya, the 
domestic market continues to absorb at least 4-5 times more produce, by value, than does the 
export market.  If produce consumed on the farm is included, the domestic share rises to 7-8 
times that of the export market.  We have also shown that value added after the farm gate is at 
least three times greater in the domestic than in the export supply chain.  At the same time, 
the domestic horticultural system is relatively uncompetitive in regional markets: while the 
country imports a substantial share of some horticultural crops, its exports of fresh produce to 
the region are negligible.  We have thus referred to the dualistic nature of the current system, 
with an export sector of commercial farmers and some organized smallholder farmers closely 
linked to export companies, competing successfully in the highly competitive and quality 
conscious European market, while the domestic sector is dominated by smallholder farmers 
receiving little if any assistance and struggling in some instances to compete with imports. 
 
The domestic horticultural system is also subject to strong forces of change at the present 
time.  Continued high rates of urbanization are expected to drive increases in demand; if per 
capita incomes begin once again to rise, total demand growth in the domestic market could 
exceed 5% per year.  Satisfying such increases in demand year after year would be a major 
challenge for any commodity supply chain.   
 
The impact of the growth of supermarkets on the FFV production and marketing system is 
difficult to assess at this time. On the one hand, both major supermarket chains indicate that 
they are moving towards “preferred grower” procurement systems which eliminate or greatly 
reduce procurement from brokers in favor of direct procurement with a limited number of 
commercial and some organized smallholder farmers.
11  This trend is driven by the chains’ 
concern with quality and cost.  Safety concerns among some consumers can be expected to 
grow in importance over time.  Supermarkets will need to respond to these concerns, and one 
likely result is a further decline in their reliance on smallholder farmers.  On the other hand, 
supermarket chains’ FFV market share is currently less than 5% even in Nairobi (lower 
elsewhere), and essentially 0% among the bottom 80% of households in the income 
distribution.  Rapid growth of this share is constrained by low per capita incomes, relatively 
low (though increasing) levels of urbanization, and high fixed costs of the new procurement 
systems.  Based on these factors, on patterns in the rest of the world, and on the fact that the 
traditional marketing system is well adapted to the shopping habits and preferences of poor 
consumers, we anticipate that supermarket chains’ FFV market share will lie between 10% 
and 20% in 10 years time.   
 
Given these current and likely market shares of supermarkets, we believe that some of the 
conclusions from the “new supermarket literature” are overstated and risk misallocating 
scarce government and donor resources.  For example, Reardon and Berdegué state that “… 
development agencies must internalize the fact that, increasingly, ‘product markets’ will 
mean ‘supermarkets’.”  Similarly, Weatherspoon et al. (2003) state for Africa that “… a 
market-demand driven approach would start by identifying the principal buyers that are 
leading the market … these … are the supermarket procurement of ficers of the leading chains 
…”.   Neither of these statements is supported by current data for Kenya’s FFV sector, nor by 
                                                 
11   Little is know of the procurement systems of hotels and high-end green grocers, but we hypothesize that they 
also engage in substantial and increasing direct procurement.   41 
what we consider to be realistic assessments of the likely growth of supermarkets in the FFV 
sector over the next 10 years.   
 
The fundamental challenge facing development planners focusing on FFV is how to expand 
domestic and regional markets for Kenyan horticultural produce, integrate the country’s 
smallholder farmers into profitable supply chains that satisfy these markets, and ensure 
consumers of a growing supply of horticultural produce with falling real prices and 
improving quality.  We suggest that the recent investment in supermarkets, though it 
introduces one more competitive dynamic that may lend more urgency to these issues, does 
not alter this fundamental challenge.  Specifically, we suggest that improving quality and 
reducing costs in assembly, wholesale, and “traditional” retail market outlets will be central 
to meeting this challenge.  Any policy recommendations that pull resources away from this 
already neglected sector are likely to have negative effects on the welfare of poor farmers and 
consumers. 
 
The level of investment needed to enhance the competitiveness of the traditional supply 
system is well beyond what the government alone could finance.  Active partnering with 
donors and private sector will thus be crucial.  In some cases, effective partnering will require 
a fundamental change of orientation on the part of government.  In the rest of this chapter we 
briefly lay out the key issues that need to be addressed, and the knowledge gaps that need to 
be filled, in each of these broad areas. 
 
5.1 Recommendations on Hard and Soft Market Infrastructure 
Traditional wholesale and many retail markets in Kenya are congested and unsanitary.
12  In 
their current condition, these markets are not an effective vehicle for expanding domestic and 
regional demand for Kenyan horticultural products by increasing quality and safety and 
reducing costs.  Moreover, if these markets do not participate in this process, then 
supermarkets and other large actors will attempt to bypass them in favor of direct 
arrangements with large commercial growers and a limited number of organized 
smallholders.  Such a development path will impose large direct and indirect costs on the 
Kenyan economy.  Most visibly, the large mass of smallholder farmers and small traders will 
be confined to a slowly growing system with little value added, high unit costs, and low profit 
potential, while poor urban consumers will pay higher prices for a more limited range of poor 
quality produce.  Market transparency will also be reduced and large players will have more 
opportunity to exercise market power.  Wholesale markets in tropical countries play key roles 
in “price discovery” by concentrating large quantities of produce from many sellers and then 
distributing it to many buyers, all in public space. This public balancing of supply and 
demand results in efficient pricing and public availability of price information.  By contrast, 
private price negotiation between supermarkets or other large buyers and their large and 
organized suppliers does not provide publicly available price information.  Over time, large 
actors operating in this less transparent system may develop market power and use it to 
increase prices to consumers and lower them to farmers.   
 
Avoiding this situation will require intelligent partnering between government, donors and 
private sector to make selected improvements in the hard and soft infrastructure of the 
traditional marketing system.  Traditional wholesale markets would be the central but not 
                                                 
12   Simon Ethangatta, former head of FPEAK, captured the situation very well when he stated in the The Nation 
in March 2004 that “All our major markets are characterized by chaos, cheating, thuggery, and dirt”.    
   42 
exclusive focus of these investments.  Improvements in three key areas will help wholesale 
markets integrate small farmers into a growing and profitable horticultural marketing system 
while providing higher quality produce to poor- and middle-income consumers.  First, 
improved logistical efficiency, especially for loading and unloading, will reduce costs and 
improve hygiene in the markets.  Second, improved hygiene combined with logistical 
improvements will make these markets more attractive options for a broader range of retail 
outlets.  Third, improved grades and standards, and more easily available information on 
prices and volume by grade of product, will increase market transparency and further attract 
customers.
13   
 
Achieving these improvements will require that wholesale market management take on a 
business orientation while recognizing that it is providing a partial public good by integrating 
smallholder farmers into a more dynamic and competitive system while also providing poor 
consumers with higher quality produce at competitive prices.  These markets will have to 
attract business by providing loading and unloading services that reduce the time it takes for 
traders and farmers to arrive, load or unload, and depart.  They will have to work with private 
sector to develop a workable system of grades and standards.  Information technology could 
allow potential buyers and sellers to access real-time information on prices and volumes by 
product grade.  Cooling and washing services would improve quality and hygiene.  Simple 
value-added services such as slicing, dicing, and simple packaging would provide a broader 
range of produce that, along with the improved hygiene and efficient logistics, could attract 
supermarkets and green grocers.   
 
This approach would be based on recognition of the potential complementary relationship 
between improvements that serve the traditional marketing value chain, and the small farmers 
and lower income consumers that use it, and those that serve the middle and upper income 
groups.  Investments in the former can improve quality and reduce costs for the whole value 
chain, thereby avoiding the splintering into a dualistic system serving different clientele with 
vastly different qualities, choice, and costs.  Growers and marketing agents who do a better 
job serving such an improved traditional system will also be in better positions to upgrade to 
meet the requirements of the higher end of the system. 
 
Active partnering between government, private sector and donors will be crucial to mobilize 
the needed financial resources and knowledge to make these improvements.  Existing 
wholesale market places will need substantial physical improvements, and may need to be 
moved to achieve these.  In many instances throughout the world, improved or new wholesale 
markets have not been used by the private sector for a complex set of reasons.  It is thus 
imperative that the decision on market location be part of a broader process that focuses on 
modernizing and improving FFV wholesaling, and creating better links back to the assembly 
and on-farm production processes (Tracey-White 2003; Tollens 1997). 
 
                                                 
13   For a good example of the type of strategic marketing information that can be provided by a proactive public 
agency in the service of the traditional marketing system, see Costa Rica’s Mercanet web page at 
http://www.mercanet.cnp.go.cr/default.htm.  Michigan State University has also done a great deal of work over 
the past 30 years on improving traditional agricultural marketing systems to reduce costs, improve quality, and 
thus facilitate demand expansion.  See especially Harrison et al, 1987.  Finally, FAO’s agricultural marketing 
division has done a great deal of work on linking improvements in market infrastructure to more fundamental 
"market facilitating" services.  See http://www.fao.org/waicent/faoinfo/agricult/ags/AGSM/infrastr.htm, Tracey-
White 2003, and Tollens 1997. 
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Government and donors could also play an important role partnering with supermarkets to 
reduce the cost to them of dealing directly with smallholder farmers.  Using government and 
donor funding, the extension service and national and international NGOs could bear the cost 
of developing viable smallholder farmer organizations and nurturing the relationships 
between these organizations and supermarkets.  Once the organizations have developed 
sufficiently and the relationship with the supermarket has been stabilized, the assistance can 
move on to other areas.  On the other hand, if investments in the traditional system are 
successful in improving quality and reducing costs, then traditional wholesale markets could 
become attractive once again to supermarkets, at least for a range of basic items.  Such 
investments have allowed public wholesale markets in several European countries to increase 
their share of the FFV market (Cadilhon, et al 2003; Fresh Produce Marketing Section 7 
Committee; 1999).   In Mexico, nearly all fresh produce, whether destined for export, 
supermarkets, or traditional retail outlets, is purchased in modern, state-of-the art public 
wholesale markets.  Thus, improvements in the traditional system and efforts to increase 
smallholder access to the direct procurement systems of supermarkets should be seen as 
complements, not substitutes.   
 
Macro infrastructure is also key to modernizing the sector.  Ahmed and Rustagi (1987) 
estimate that more than half of the substantial difference in marketing costs between Africa 
and Asia is attributable to poor physical infrastructure (as quoted in Tollens 1997).  The poor 
condition of most of Kenya’s roads implies high vehicle maintenance costs and consequently 
high transportation costs (Kamau, 2000).  Similarly, lack of passable roads during rain 
seasons renders them inaccessible to collecting wholesalers and results in delayed 
transportation of perishable commodities.  Improvement in secondary and tertiary roads is 
especially important.  As the Ministry of Works allocates funds for the development of rural 
roads, a horticultural task force should be formed to lobby for targeting of areas that would 
most benefit horticulture.  All of these efforts – improved hard and soft infrastructure in the 
traditional system, improved direct links between supermarkets and small farmers, and 
improved secondary and tertiary roads -- will have very positive implications for rural 
economic growth and poverty alleviation.   
 
5.2 Other Recommendations 
Duty Concessions: Unequal duties at border points may hinder the access of Kenyan 
produce to Tanzanian markets.  Hence there is need for harmonization of duties in EAC. 
Kenya Revenue Authority should also harmonize the levies charged on various horticultural 
commodities traded across the border points.  
 
Border Point Infrastructure:  All Tanzanian border points with Kenya have electricity 
whereas in Kenya, only two of the five border points have electricity.  Electricity supply 
work to the remaining border points (e.g. Shimon junction to Lunga Lunga, Bisill to 
Namanga and Migori to Isebania) should now be completed so as to enhance computerization 
and installation of communication network.    
 
Telecommunications:  Telecommunication services in Kenya are expensive and unreliable, 
imposing real costs on trade. In Tanzania, due to an open sky policy, low cost 
communications are available at most border points.  Kenya needs to liberalize its 
telecommunications services so as to increase competition and reduce costs.  
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5.3   Further Research 
This report has provided a relatively detailed assessment of Kenya’s horticultural production 
and marketing system from the farm up to the wholesale level.  It has also identified the range 
of actors operating at the retail level, and has addressed the small but emerging role of 
supermarkets.  In so doing, it has attempted to place these new entrants in the context of the 
broader FFV marketing system.  The challenge now is to understand in more detail the 
behavior and performance of the traditional FFV production and marketing system, and how 
it can be improved to bring down the cost to a majority of consumers yet present better 
opportunities for growers.   An additional and important question is to understand how the 
traditional system relates to and might be affected by emerging supermarkets.  Specifically, 
national policy makers and municipal authorities need to understand the bottlenecks that, if 
relieved, could substantially reduce costs and allow this system to compete more effectively 
with what might be an emerging parallel and more "modern" system driven by supermarkets.  
If this process of identifying and relieving key bottlenecks in the traditional system is 
successful, then it will be possible to avoid creating an entrenched dualistic system and the 
ills of high costs and poor options for both consumers and farmers that such a system implies.   
 
To help guide investments in pursuit of this goal, more information is needed in the following 
areas: 
 
Urban Retailing:  A recently completed consumer survey in Nairobi, conducted by Tegemeo 
Institute, will soon allow calculations of market shares for the full range of retail outlet types.  
In addition to these share data, one needs to establish the costs and standard operating 
procedures of each retailer’s procurement system, and key bottlenecks that, if relieved, could 
reduce their costs and increase the quality of what they offer.  We have estimated that the 
supermarket FFV share is less than 10% in Nairobi, but will have data that directly inform 
this issue with the new Tegemeo survey results.   
 
The role of product quality in the traditional marketing system:  Formal quality standards 
play little if any role in the traditional FFV marketing system.  Is there evidence of price 
differentiation based on informal grading?  Is there evidence that quality differences affect 
the allocation of commodities to alternative retail channels?  Understanding the degree and 
specific mechanisms of quality differentiation in the traditional system is fundamental to 
designing a more formal system of grades and standards that is workable and that can 
increase transparency and create a dynamic of constant quality improvement. 
 
Urban Wholesaling:  The behavior and performance of urban wholesale markets affects 
costs, prices, and the distribution of benefits among farmers, traders, and consumers 
throughout the production and marketing system.  We have noted how improvements in 
logistics, hygiene, information technology, and simple value added services could generate 
positive knock-on effects throughout the system (Chapter 7).  Identifying useful specific 
investments in these areas will require applied research in close collaboration with retail and 
wholesale traders who use the current wholesale market or who may potentially use an 
improved market  
 
Links between urban markets and rural producers:  We know relatively little about the 
specific mechanisms that rural assemblers and collecting wholesalers use to procure produce 
for urban markets.  We do know (from Chapter 4) that the production and marketing of fruits 
and vegetables, even among smallholder farmers, is quite concentrated.  To design programs   45 
that link small farmers more closely to market outlets and level the playing field among 
farmers and traders, one needs to know more about the system wide “price discovery” 
process: how are prices negotiated at key points in the supply chain, what information do 
farmers and traders have access to in these negotiations, and what additional information 
might they need to plan more market oriented production for both the traditional and 
emerging supermarket markets? 
 
One would also want to establish how many small farmers sell through associations, what 
cost and other marketing advantages these associations provide, and what if any price premia 
these organized farmers receive.  Finally, it is important to know what the share of 
smallholder farmers vs larger commercial farmers is for the main horticultural crops.  
 
Rural marketing:  We anticipate that many rural households will be net buyers of 
horticultural produce.  If this is true, then the performance of the rural marketing system, 
including rural retailing, will affect the real incomes of net sellers and net buyers.  A 
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